1
Introduction
There is a large literature in international relations that examines the effects of changing power
on the security relationship between actors in the international system. Research on this topic
has ranged from positive and epistemological academic debates to ones more closely tied to con-
Despite this large scope of study, there are very few formal models
that explicitly incorporate power shifts and even fewer that provide micro-founded game theoretic
This paucity of formal strategic models is most likely due to the inherent complexities of strate-
gic interaction during periods when relative power is changing. The researcher is confronted with
a number of modelling decisions, the robustness of which are ex ante unknown. In a bargaining
framework, such questions include whether the declining or rising state (or both) gets to make
offers in which round of bargaining, how many offers can be made per round, and which side has
the ability to initiate conflict. Such issues are made even harder by the presence of asymmetric
The sequence of moves can have a direct impact on the evolution of the beliefs
of the players which will affect which strategies they adopt in equilibrium. As recent real world
events have shown, much of the debate over issues like preventive war centers on the fact that
states often have act in dynamic environments with asymmetric information. Dealing with these
issues often forces researchers to make decisions which need not be substantively robust but are
1
The literature on shifting power goes back to Thucydides (1996) and includes contemporary research on power
transition theory (Organski 1968; Organski and Kugler 1980; Kugler and Lemke 1996, 2000; DiCicco and Levy
1999), hegemonic transition theory (Gilpin 1981), leadership long cycle theory (Thompson 1988), and power cycle
theory (Doran and Parsons 1980). One hypothesized causal mechanism leading from power shifts to war, one that
is discounted by many power transition theorists, is a “preventive war” by the declining state to block the rise of the
ascending state before the latter amasses superior military power (Levy 1987; Van Evera 1999; Copeland 2000; Levy
and Gochal 2001/2). Interest in the concept of prevention, along with its cousin preemption (an attack in anticipation
of an attack by the adversary, to secure the first-mover advantage), has grown substantially given central role of these
concepts in the U.S. National Security Strategy and in the 2003 war in Iraq.
2
There are a number of static formal models that focus on which levels of relative power between actors is most
likely to lead to conflict.
3
See Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) and Muthoo (1999) for discussions of the fragility of incomplete information
bargaining models.
2
Convention