All Academic, Inc. Research Logo

Info/CitationFAQResearchAll Academic Inc.
Document

Bayesian Equilibria and Shifting Power Bargaining Games
Unformatted Document Text:  [27] Powell, Robert. 2004. “The Inefficient Use of Power: Costly Conflict with Complete Infor- mation.” American Political Science Review. 94, 2: 231-241. [28] Rudin, Walter. 1976. Principles of Mathematical Analysis, New York: McGraw-Hill. [29] Sigal, Leon W. 1998. Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea. Princeton: Princeton University Press. [30] Skreta, Vasiliki. 2004. “Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms.” Working paper, Department of Economics, University of Minnesota. [31] Spier, K. 1994. “Pretrial Bargaining and the Design of Fee-Shifting Rules.” RAND Journal of Economics, 25:197-214. [32] Thucydides. 1996. ”History of the Peloponnesian War.” In Robert B. Strassler (ed.), The Landmark Thucydides. New York: Free Press. [33] Traub, James. 2004. “Is Iran Going Nuclear?” The New York Times Magazine. June 13, Section 6. [34] Van Evera, Stephen. 1999. Causes of War. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. [35] Wang, Ruque. 2000. “Separating equilibria in a continuous-time bargaining model with two- sided uncertainty.” International Journal of Game Theory. 29, 2: 29-240. [36] Wit, Joel S., Daniel B. Poneman, and Robert L. Gallucci. 2004. Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis. Washington, D.C.: Brookings. 28

Authors: Gochal, Joseph. and Levy, Jack.
first   previous   Page 28 of 28   next   last



background image
[27] Powell, Robert. 2004. “The Inefficient Use of Power: Costly Conflict with Complete Infor-
mation.” American Political Science Review. 94, 2: 231-241.
[28] Rudin, Walter. 1976. Principles of Mathematical Analysis, New York: McGraw-Hill.
[29] Sigal, Leon W. 1998. Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
[30] Skreta, Vasiliki. 2004. “Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms.” Working paper, Department of
Economics, University of Minnesota.
[31] Spier, K. 1994. “Pretrial Bargaining and the Design of Fee-Shifting Rules.” RAND Journal
of Economics, 25:197-214.
[32] Thucydides. 1996. ”History of the Peloponnesian War.” In Robert B. Strassler (ed.), The
Landmark Thucydides. New York: Free Press.
[33] Traub, James. 2004. “Is Iran Going Nuclear?” The New York Times Magazine. June 13,
Section 6.
[34] Van Evera, Stephen. 1999. Causes of War. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
[35] Wang, Ruque. 2000. “Separating equilibria in a continuous-time bargaining model with two-
sided uncertainty.” International Journal of Game Theory. 29, 2: 29-240.
[36] Wit, Joel S., Daniel B. Poneman, and Robert L. Gallucci. 2004. Going Critical: The First
North Korean Nuclear Crisis. Washington, D.C.: Brookings.
28


Convention
Convention is an application service for managing large or small academic conferences, annual meetings, and other types of events!
Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf.
Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets!
Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more!
Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering.
Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more!
Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches!
Click here for more information.

first   previous   Page 28 of 28   next   last

©2008 All Academic, Inc.