All Academic, Inc. Research Logo

Info/CitationFAQResearchAll Academic Inc.
Document

Bayesian Equilibria and Shifting Power Bargaining Games
Unformatted Document Text:  Definition An outcome ω ∈ Ω is incentive compatible if and only if for all r, r ∈ [r, r], U R (r; r) = max r U R (r ; r), (5) or U R (r; r) ≥ U R (r ; r). (6) While incentive compatibility is necessary and sufficient to characterize the entire set of Bayesian equilibria for a any game, it is sometimes useful to restrict this set by examining only those equilib- rium that meet additional constraints. For example, we may want to add some sort of participation or individual rationality constraints on the set of incentive compatible equilibria. We discuss such possibilities in the conclusion. Our first result, which also holds in discrete time, establishes a “compound” monotonicity condition that must hold for all incentive compatible outcomes. Lemma 1 Incentive compatibility implies that for all r ≥ r , p(r)e −ρt(r) ≤ p(r )e −ρt(r ) . (7) Proof By incentive compatibility, U R (r;r) ≥ U R (r ;r) and U R (r ;r ) ≥ U R (r;r ). Substituting in 9

Authors: Gochal, Joseph. and Levy, Jack.
first   previous   Page 9 of 28   next   last



background image
Definition An outcome ω ∈ Ω is incentive compatible if and only if for all r, r ∈ [r, r],
U
R
(r; r) = max
r
U
R
(r ; r),
(5)
or
U
R
(r; r) ≥ U
R
(r ; r).
(6)
While incentive compatibility is necessary and sufficient to characterize the entire set of Bayesian
equilibria for a any game, it is sometimes useful to restrict this set by examining only those equilib-
rium that meet additional constraints. For example, we may want to add some sort of participation
or individual rationality constraints on the set of incentive compatible equilibria. We discuss such
possibilities in the conclusion.
Our first result, which also holds in discrete time, establishes a “compound” monotonicity
condition that must hold for all incentive compatible outcomes.
Lemma 1 Incentive compatibility implies that for all r ≥ r ,
p(r)e
−ρt(r)
≤ p(r )e
−ρt(r )
.
(7)
Proof By incentive compatibility, U
R
(r;r) ≥ U
R
(r ;r) and U
R
(r ;r ) ≥ U
R
(r;r ). Substituting in
9


Convention
All Academic Convention is the premier solution for your association's abstract management solutions needs.
Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf.
Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets!
Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more!
Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering.
Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more!
Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches!
Click here for more information.

first   previous   Page 9 of 28   next   last

©2008 All Academic, Inc.