(Page 2 of 38) - Hegemony`s Effect on Interstate Trade: Leveling the Playing Field - or the Rich Get Richer While the Poor Get Poorer? authored by Sacko, David. and Jungblut, Bernadette.

The Persistent Puzzle of the “Dominant-Leading-Imperial-Hegemonic” Power

Both the United States and Great Britain have used their power to govern the international system,

by meeting direct challenges to the status quo—or by overwhelming those that refused to acquiesce to their
changes in the status quo—as well as by deterring or defusing challenges. Many social scientists,
historians, journalists and other aficionados of international affairs are familiar with this essential dynamic
in world politics: the most powerful state being the most politically (and militarily) active. The United
States and Great Britain have been indisputably recognized as playing a special, important role in world
politics. The definition and parameters of that role, however, are widely contested. It is hardly questioned
that the United States is currently the greatest of the major powers, particularly since the end of World War
II, and more recently, the end of the Cold War. Most observers also recognize Great Britain’s special role
in world politics before World War I, particularly in the mid-nineteenth century. Perspectives differ,
however, on what the role is—or should be—for countries that hold this dominant position. Many experts
also question the benefits of an active, international, dominating leader, both for the system and the leading
state. Thus, despite acceptance of the notion of this “special” role, exactly what, how, and why the
dominant state acts – and the consequences of those actions for the leading state and others – remain a
puzzle.

Most importantly for the purposes of our paper, the effects of the hegemon’s behavior on the

system as a whole (here, specifically on international trade) and at other levels of analysis (here, on both
sub-systemic major power and dyadic trade) are not fully understood. At a time when the United States is
being hailed by pundits, policy-makers, (and even certain scholars – see Chomsky 2003) as “the” most
dominant state since the Roman Empire, the effects of hegemony on the system as a whole and for
particular states seem to be of paramount concern. Thus, we focus our attention on more completely
articulating a theory of hegemonic governance; deriving hypotheses specific to international trade that
follow from that theory; and examining these propositions empirically with much-improved conceptual and
operational assessments of both “hegemonic power” and “hegemonic interest.”

An intermittent but persistent theme of scholarly research concentrates on the dominant state’s

role in maintaining—or at least influencing—the international order (Carr 1939; Organski 1968;
Kindleberger 1973; Gilpin 1981; Wallerstein 1981; Modelski 1987; Doyle 1988; Watson 1992). As this
literature attests, an appropriate term for the dominant actor in world politics that creates and then attempts
to maintain the international system is the hegemon. The hegemon assumes a qualitatively different role in
world politics, as other states most frequently look to it to provide leadership—or outright control—to
bring stability to many international policy areas. The many theories that share this core idea (Power
Transition Theory [Organski 1968], Leadership Theory [Kindleberger 1986], Hegemonic Stability Theory
[Gilpin 1981], Long Cycle Theory [Modelski 1986], World System Theory [Wallerstein 1981], and others)
can be broadly characterized as hegemonic theories. They share the common supposition that on some
level, a strong hegemon will stabilize global security and the world economy and help coordinate other
collective action problems.

Beyond this fundamental assertion, there is much divergence of hegemonic theorists’ normative

perspectives, secondary assumptions, and final expectations. The main point is this: in recent years, the
rich scholarly tradition addressing the question of precisely what behavior the hegemon engages in, as well
as how and why it does so, has been largely overlooked and underutilized. Given this, we have little
understanding of how the hegemon affects the system as a whole – or particular types of states. Robert
Gilpin’s Hegemonic Stability Theory (1981) is an elegant systematic reflection of hegemony and stability
that explains the effect of the hegemon on security in a meaningful, intelligent way. While Gilpin was
neither the first nor the last to address questions of hegemonic stability, he is the only one systematically to
look at the behavior of the hegemon. Gilpin’s main contribution is on the level of grand theory, the
generalized explanation of a wide range of phenomena. For our purposes in this paper, Gilpin’s
Hegemonic Stability Theory provides a starting point for addressing both the role and the behavior of the
leading dominant state.

Satisfactorily answering the question “How does hegemony affect interstate trade?” involves both