 |
Hegemony`s Effect on Interstate Trade: Leveling the Playing Field - or the Rich Get Richer While the Poor Get Poorer?
| |
| | Unformatted Document Text:
2
theoretical and empirical extensions of the general hegemonic stability literature. To that end, this paper posits a theoretical elaboration and extension of Hegemonic Stability Theory to predict more than just the occurrence of global wars. In economic terms, stability implies consistency and certainty in the terms of exchange – to facilitate accurate expectations regarding future transactions. This is particularly true of international trade. Our model predicts that the hegemon will promote stability across the system – thus increasing systemic level trade. Our model also predicts that the hegemon will promote stability – and thus increased trade – among states and within dyads where the hegemon has an objective interest.
This exposition and application of hegemonic stability theory adds to the general literature on the
scientific study of international trade by investigating an overlooked explanation at multiple levels of analysis (in particular, at the underutilized systemic level of analysis). Although systemic theories of international politics were once the focus of the field, they no longer capture the attention and imagination of researchers. Advanced data collection and more properly specified theories have primarily led researchers to analyze dyadic levels of interaction. Thus, little recent work has been done on the analysis of systemic-level variables. Most pertinent to our paper, the current focus of inquiry regarding international trade is at the dyadic level, which often ignores systemic variables. Structural variables, however, can have important theoretical significance for the analysis and understanding of interstate trade. Potentially fruitful frameworks, such as Hegemonic Stability Theory, remain largely ignored in the most recent literature on international trade. Our formulation of Hegemonic Stability Theory offers a new perspective in the field, providing a more detailed view of the multi-level effects of “hegemonic power” and “hegemonic interest.”
Literature Review
Attempts to specify the effects of leadership on the international system have their unambiguous
beginning with Charles Kindleberger’s The World in Depression in 1973. For the next twenty years, political science (and to a lesser degree economics and sociology) attempted to specify, formalize, and test theoretical statements that at least were partially derived from Kindleberger’s work. In essence, he states that world economic leadership is necessary for the maximum efficiency for the world economy and can only come from one stabilizing nation-state, the state that possesses predominant power. Since its original formulation, subsequent scholars have refined, augmented, detracted from, found support for, and claimed to “disprove” Kindleberger’s argument.
This section examines the extant literature on the relationship between world political leadership
and international economic stability in order to determine whether such a relationship exists, and if it does, offer an exposition of its dynamics. The first section reviews the basic concepts of the theoretical notion that Robert Keohane (1980) referred to as ‘Hegemonic Stability Theory’ and how the unwanted child progressed through its infancy in the seventies. Unfortunately, as with most, its adolescence was as not as cheery as its formative years. The 1980s saw a great deal of derision in the field concerning the theoretical refinement of hegemonic stability theory and indeterminate results regarding its initial testing. Thus, we need thoroughly and coherently to articulate the theoretical arguments concerning the precise causal mechanism underlying this dynamic. In short, the complete story needs to be told – and then empirically investigated. The second section reviews the formal and empirical literature that investigated early theoretical claims and concludes that the tests conducted yield contradictory evidence. We assert that the theory posited by Charles Kindleberger in 1973 (and amended in 1981) was never adequately tested. Indeed, key theoretical and empirical questions and issues remain. Thus, in this paper, we focus on just such an endeavor. Concepts and Contending Theoretical Perspectives
According to the literature (Lake, 1984 and 1993; Snidal 1985; Gadzey 1994) the progenitors of
the theory that calls for international leadership in the world economy i.e., hegemonic stability theory, are
|
| | Authors: Sacko, David. and Jungblut, Bernadette. |
|
| |
|
|
2
theoretical and empirical extensions of the general hegemonic stability literature. To that end, this paper
posits a theoretical elaboration and extension of Hegemonic Stability Theory to predict more than just the
occurrence of global wars. In economic terms, stability implies consistency and certainty in the terms of
exchange – to facilitate accurate expectations regarding future transactions. This is particularly true of
international trade. Our model predicts that the hegemon will promote stability across the system – thus
increasing systemic level trade. Our model also predicts that the hegemon will promote stability – and thus
increased trade – among states and within dyads where the hegemon has an objective interest.
This exposition and application of hegemonic stability theory adds to the general literature on the
scientific study of international trade by investigating an overlooked explanation at multiple levels of
analysis (in particular, at the underutilized systemic level of analysis). Although systemic theories of
international politics were once the focus of the field, they no longer capture the attention and imagination
of researchers. Advanced data collection and more properly specified theories have primarily led
researchers to analyze dyadic levels of interaction. Thus, little recent work has been done on the analysis
of systemic-level variables. Most pertinent to our paper, the current focus of inquiry regarding
international trade is at the dyadic level, which often ignores systemic variables. Structural variables,
however, can have important theoretical significance for the analysis and understanding of interstate trade.
Potentially fruitful frameworks, such as Hegemonic Stability Theory, remain largely ignored in the most
recent literature on international trade. Our formulation of Hegemonic Stability Theory offers a new
perspective in the field, providing a more detailed view of the multi-level effects of “hegemonic power”
and “hegemonic interest.”
Literature Review
Attempts to specify the effects of leadership on the international system have their unambiguous
beginning with Charles Kindleberger’s The World in Depression in 1973. For the next twenty years,
political science (and to a lesser degree economics and sociology) attempted to specify, formalize, and test
theoretical statements that at least were partially derived from Kindleberger’s work. In essence, he states
that world economic leadership is necessary for the maximum efficiency for the world economy and can
only come from one stabilizing nation-state, the state that possesses predominant power. Since its original
formulation, subsequent scholars have refined, augmented, detracted from, found support for, and claimed
to “disprove” Kindleberger’s argument.
This section examines the extant literature on the relationship between world political leadership
and international economic stability in order to determine whether such a relationship exists, and if it does,
offer an exposition of its dynamics. The first section reviews the basic concepts of the theoretical notion
that Robert Keohane (1980) referred to as ‘Hegemonic Stability Theory’ and how the unwanted child
progressed through its infancy in the seventies. Unfortunately, as with most, its adolescence was as not as
cheery as its formative years. The 1980s saw a great deal of derision in the field concerning the theoretical
refinement of hegemonic stability theory and indeterminate results regarding its initial testing. Thus, we
need thoroughly and coherently to articulate the theoretical arguments concerning the precise causal
mechanism underlying this dynamic. In short, the complete story needs to be told – and then empirically
investigated. The second section reviews the formal and empirical literature that investigated early
theoretical claims and concludes that the tests conducted yield contradictory evidence. We assert that the
theory posited by Charles Kindleberger in 1973 (and amended in 1981) was never adequately tested.
Indeed, key theoretical and empirical questions and issues remain. Thus, in this paper, we focus on just
such an endeavor.
Concepts and Contending Theoretical Perspectives
According to the literature (Lake, 1984 and 1993; Snidal 1985; Gadzey 1994) the progenitors of
the theory that calls for international leadership in the world economy i.e., hegemonic stability theory, are
|
|
 Convention | | Convention is an application service for managing large or small academic conferences, annual meetings, and other types of events! | | Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. | | Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! | | Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! | | Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. | | Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! | | Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! | | Click here for more information. |
|
|
|
| |
|
|
|
