2
1. Introduction
The post-Cold War era has witnessed an explosion of interest in what third parties can do
to stop, mitigate, or prevent violent conflict abroad. In discussions of what makes third-
party intervention succeed or fail, one crucial set of issues revolves around the role of
impartiality in shaping intervention outcomes. Should interveners refrain from taking
sides, or will they be more effective if they weigh in on behalf of one of the conflicting
parties? How important is it that peace proposals be guided by principles of fairness and
justice rather than by the intervener’s own interests and biases? Does it matter whether
interveners have a history of favoring one side at the expense of the other?
Although these questions are hardly new, students of conflict management have
yet to reach agreement about how they should be answered. While some scholars argue
that would-be peacemakers are more likely to succeed if they adopt the role of an “honest
broker,”
1
others maintain that impartiality in fact detracts from the ability of interveners to
promote a peaceful settlement.
2
Yet others claim that whether third parties are impartial
or biased does not matter much at all; what really counts is the power, commitment, and
diplomatic leverage they bring to the table.
3
Empirical studies of the relationship between impartiality and intervention
outcomes mirror the inconclusiveness of theoretical debate about the subject. Anecdotal
and case study evidence has been offered for – and against – all of the aforementioned
1
Proponents of this view include Bratt 1997, 63-65; Carnevale and Pruitt 1992; Fisher 1995, 39;
Jentleson 2000, 341; Rauchhaus 2003; Rothchild and Lake 1998, 218-19; Stulberg 1987, 37; and
Young 1967, 81.
2
Among others, see Betts 1994; Gelpi 1999; Kaufmann 1996, 164; Kydd 2003; and Luttwak 1999, 38.
3
See, for example, Bercovitch and Houston 1996, 26; Smith and Stam 2003; Touval 1975; and Touval
and Zartman 1985, 255-58.
Convention