8
My own argument, developed more formally in my dissertation, suggests that
these seemingly competing views can be reconciled with the help of two additional
variables. More specifically, I suggest that whether impartiality enhances or undermines
the effectiveness of interventions aimed at resolving problems of credible commitment
depends on (1) whether the intervener pursues an informational or enforcement strategy
and (2) the type of commitment problem that the intervener seeks to address.
With regard to the latter of these intervening variables, I begin my argument by
distinguishing commitment problems according to whether they are symmetrical or
asymmetrical in nature.
Asymmetrical commitment problems characterize situations where only (or at least
primarily) one party to a dispute cannot credibly commit to faithful implementation of a
possible settlement. This type of commitment problem arises most frequently under
conditions of shifting power. A good example is Fearon’s discussion of bargaining
between an ethnic minority and a majority group under conditions of state collapse.
14
As
suggested by Fearon, the key question for the minority in this scenario is whether to join
the majority in a new state or fight for secession. From the minority’s perspective, the
problem is that joining the majority in forming a new state is likely to diminish the
minority’s bargaining power in the long run, as state institutions consolidate and become
captured by the majority. Since the majority cannot credibly commit to refrain from such
exploitation, the minority has an incentive to fight for independence while state
institutions are still weak or only emerging – notwithstanding the existence of peaceful
bargains that would leave both the majority and the minority better off than they are by
going to war, provided these bargains could be enforced.
14
Fearon 1998.
Convention