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Effects of Local News on Political Representation
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In a recent study, Ansolabehere, Snyder and Stewart (2001) demonstrate the limits of political accountability. Democratic districts tend to elect Democratic MCs who then mainly support Democratic policies in Congress. The same holds on the Republican side. So far, so good. But, as Ansolabehere et al. continue, parties routinely nominate candidates who are too far left or right for their districts, and voters then often simply choose whichever candidate shares their party affiliation. Even challengers attempting to beat incumbents who are too extreme do not routinely converge to the median of district opinion. Ansolabehere et al. find some evidence of convergence, but this responsiveness “is not the main story. Competing candidates in congressional elections almost never converge” to the median of district opinion. Ansolabehere et al. regard the failure of MCs to represent the median opinion of their districts as surprising. The logic of Downsian spatial competition seems to demand it, and empirical analysis shows that candidates do, in fact, pay a modest electoral price for failure to converge to median opinion (Canes-Wrone, Fiorina, and Brady, 2001). Yet extreme partisanship has been, as Ansolabehere et al show, the dominant pattern in U.S. House elections for much of the period from the late 19
th
century to the present.
The present paper considers this problem in the context of political information. It finds that the tendency toward non-convergence to district opinion, as identified by Ansolabehere et al., is most pronounced in districts in which newspapers and other media supply little or no coverage of MC behavior. Or, to state the finding another way, members of Congress are more responsive to median opinion in districts in which the news media provide information about MC activity. The amount of this media-induced convergence is modest. But the reason, as we argue, is that the amount of information supplied to voters is never very great. Our findings are therefore most useful for the theoretical point they make: That if the media supplied and voters absorbed much more information than they do, the amount of MC responsiveness to voter opinion would be notably higher as well.
T
HEORETICAL
B
ACKGROUND
Alternative models of representation Beyond the general notion of electoral accountability, democratic theory contains no canonical specification of how legislative representation ought to work. Some theorists do not even believe that elected representatives need be bound by constituency opinion. Edmund Burke’s “trustee” model, for instance, holds that representation means acting in the interests of the district, independent of what constituents say they want. In that case, we are at a loss to measure representation in any systematic way. We are on only slightly firmer analytical ground if we think MCs should be bound by constituent opinion. How tightly should they be bound and how can we test whether they are? Early scholars used correlation coefficients to measure the relationship between MC behavior and voter opinion, but that approach was often misleading because it erases
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| | Authors: Cohen, Marty., Noel, Hans. and Zaller, John. |
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2
In a recent study, Ansolabehere, Snyder and Stewart (2001) demonstrate the limits of
political accountability. Democratic districts tend to elect Democratic MCs who then
mainly support Democratic policies in Congress. The same holds on the Republican side.
So far, so good. But, as Ansolabehere et al. continue, parties routinely nominate
candidates who are too far left or right for their districts, and voters then often simply
choose whichever candidate shares their party affiliation. Even challengers attempting to
beat incumbents who are too extreme do not routinely converge to the median of district
opinion. Ansolabehere et al. find some evidence of convergence, but this responsiveness
“is not the main story. Competing candidates in congressional elections almost never
converge” to the median of district opinion.
Ansolabehere et al. regard the failure of MCs to represent the median opinion of their
districts as surprising. The logic of Downsian spatial competition seems to demand it,
and empirical analysis shows that candidates do, in fact, pay a modest electoral price for
failure to converge to median opinion (Canes-Wrone, Fiorina, and Brady, 2001). Yet
extreme partisanship has been, as Ansolabehere et al show, the dominant pattern in U.S.
House elections for much of the period from the late 19
th
century to the present.
The present paper considers this problem in the context of political information. It finds
that the tendency toward non-convergence to district opinion, as identified by
Ansolabehere et al., is most pronounced in districts in which newspapers and other media
supply little or no coverage of MC behavior. Or, to state the finding another way,
members of Congress are more responsive to median opinion in districts in which the
news media provide information about MC activity.
The amount of this media-induced convergence is modest. But the reason, as we argue,
is that the amount of information supplied to voters is never very great. Our findings are
therefore most useful for the theoretical point they make: That if the media supplied and
voters absorbed much more information than they do, the amount of MC responsiveness
to voter opinion would be notably higher as well.
T
HEORETICAL
B
ACKGROUND
Alternative models of representation
Beyond the general notion of electoral accountability, democratic theory contains no
canonical specification of how legislative representation ought to work. Some theorists
do not even believe that elected representatives need be bound by constituency opinion.
Edmund Burke’s “trustee” model, for instance, holds that representation means acting in
the interests of the district, independent of what constituents say they want. In that case,
we are at a loss to measure representation in any systematic way.
We are on only slightly firmer analytical ground if we think MCs should be bound by
constituent opinion. How tightly should they be bound and how can we test whether they
are? Early scholars used correlation coefficients to measure the relationship between MC
behavior and voter opinion, but that approach was often misleading because it erases
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