Author's Keywords: elections, congress, congressional elections, parties, legislature, legislative, positioning, position-taking, distributive policy, projects, pork, downs, valence, valence advantage, voting, empirical test, spatial, theory, marginality, trust, mcmc, bayesian, ideal point, ideal points, convergence, divergence, candidate convergence, senate, house, constituency, representation, shirking, ideological shirking, presidential election forecasts, campaigns, vote, proximity models, model testing, quality challenger	Convention All Academic Convention is the premier solution for your association's abstract management solutions needs. Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! Click here for more information.
Association: Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
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Grose, Christian. "Valence Advantages and Position-Taking in the U.S. Congress: An Empirical Test" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hilton Chicago and the Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL, Sep 02, 2004 <Not Available>. 2009-05-26 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p60278_index.html>

Grose, C. , 2004-09-02 "Valence Advantages and Position-Taking in the U.S. Congress: An Empirical Test" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hilton Chicago and the Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL Online <.PDF>. 2009-05-26 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p60278_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Review Method: Peer Reviewed Abstract: Does the allocation of “pork” projects to constituents affect legislative position-taking? Are legislators who deliver substantial amounts of federal largesse more likely to diverge from their campaign opponents and from their constituency medians? Three competing, though overlapping, literatures are examined in this paper: valence theories of position-taking, trust theories of position-taking, and marginality theories of position-taking. These three literatures lead to competing predictions in terms of the extent that legislators deviate from their constituencies and diverge from their campaign opponents given the extent of valence advantages available to incumbents. Examples of valence advantages are numerous (e.g., charisma, constituency service), though we measure an incumbent’s valence advantage as the extent of federal project outlays distributed to a legislator’s constituency. The marginality hypothesis suggests a linear and negative relationship between project allocations and legislator deviation from the district. The trust hypothesis also suggests a linear relationship, though in a positive direction. The valence hypothesis suggests a nonlinear relationship, where increased levels of project allocations at first lead to more legislator convergence toward the median, but eventually lead to more legislator divergence from the median. These competing expectations are tested by examining candidate convergence data from the 1996 U.S. House elections and data on senator divergence from their states’ median voters during the 104th-107th Congresses. One key contribution of this paper is the creation of ideal point estimates of legislators and constituency medians on a common scale using MCMC ideal point estimation techniques. The findings are that valence theories are demonstrated when examining incumbent divergence from the constituency median, though these theories are not demonstrated when examining candidate divergence from one another. In addition, we also find that the extent of project outlays (though not deviation from the constituency median) is related to the margin of victory for legislators. The deviation from the constituency median, and not the extent of project outlays, is directly related to the likelihood of winning.

Valence Advantages and Ideological Shirking in the U.S. Senate: Why Do Senators Take Positions That Are Different From Their Constituents' Preferences?

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