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1. Introduction
One of the most commonly-observed characteristics of the modern House of
Representatives is that the floor of the House exhibits a high degree of deference to
standing committees’ bill proposals. Indeed, though there is substantial disagreement
about the reasons and implications of this deference, theoretical and empirical scholars of
various stripes agree that bills reported from committees enjoy high levels of success
during floor consideration. In stark contrast, however, various historical and political
science studies of committees in the earliest decades of congressional history paint a
picture of committees as subservient agents of the House as a whole, with little
independent influence upon House decision making.
Perhaps surprisingly, given this sharp difference in the perceived role of
committees in the legislative process, and given also the centrality of committees in
studies of Congress, little work systematically addresses questions about either the timing
or causes of the emergence of deference to committee decisions. Some scholars suggest
that deference emerged along with the standing committee system itself in the period
from roughly 1815-1825, while others suggest that deference still was not the norm as
late as the end of the 19
th
century.
In this paper I study the question of deference to committees by exploring
whether such deference occurred in the decades immediately following the creation of the
standing committee system. My goal for this paper is to paint a picture of committee
influence and deference that: first, provides insight as to whether committees exercised
discretion over bills in the antebellum law making process; second, helps to flesh out our
understanding of the evolution of the legislative process, and of committees’ place
Convention