2
therein; third, illuminates the nature of winning and losing coalitions on committees; and
fourth, provides evidence that is at least suggestive of the (non-) generality of theories of
congressional organization developed in the context of the modern House.
More specifically, I examine the frequency with which committees were
“rolled”—that is, the House passed a bill that was opposed on final passage by a majority
of members of the committee that had originally reported the bill—on bills within their
jurisdictions.
Taking each such committee roll as evidence of non-deference to the
committee of jurisdiction, I find that the frequency of committee rolls was generally quite
low, and was in line with the levels of deference observed in modern congresses (albeit
using different measures). I also explore the incidence of rolls among majority and
minority party contingents on each committee. I find that majority party committee
contingents were rolled more often than were overall committee contingents, though the
difference is not dramatic. I find additionally that minority party contingents were rolled
decidedly more often than either overall committees or majority party contingents.
I proceed as follows. In the next section, I review the theoretical underpinnings of
committee deference in the modern House, as well as claims made regarding the extent of
deference in the antebellum House. In the third section, I spell out the methods by which
I examine these claims, and in the fourth section, I present the results regarding deference
to committees. In the fifth section, I use the same methods to evaluate the extent to which
majority and minority party members of committees were rolled on final passage.
1
Political science use of the term “rolled” to refer to committees faring poorly on the
floor dates back at least to Fenno (1966), and also appears prominently in Shepsle and
Weingast (1987) and Weingast (1989).
Convention