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Valence Advantages and Position-Taking in the U.S. Congress: An Empirical Test
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Valence Advantages, “Pork” Projects, and Position-taking in the U.S. Congress
Christian R. Grose
Lawrence University
Box 599
Appleton, WI 54911
920-993-6273
christian.## email not listed ##
Åsa Byström
Lawrence University
Ashe N. Haté
Lawrence University
Abstract: Does the allocation of “pork” projects to constituents affect legislative position-taking? Are legislators who deliver substantial amounts of federal largesse more likely to diverge from their campaign opponents and from their constituency medians? Three competing, though overlapping, literatures are examined in this paper: valence theories of position-taking, trust theories of position-taking, and marginality theories of position-taking. These three literatures lead to competing predictions in terms of the extent that legislators deviate from their constituencies and diverge from their campaign opponents given the extent of valence advantages available to incumbents. Examples of valence advantages are numerous (e.g., charisma, constituency service), though we measure an incumbent’s valence advantage as the extent of federal project outlays distributed to a legislator’s constituency. The marginality hypothesis suggests a linear and negative relationship between project allocations and legislator deviation from the district. The trust hypothesis also suggests a linear relationship, though in a positive direction. The valence hypothesis suggests a nonlinear relationship, where increased levels of project allocations at first lead to more legislator convergence toward the median, but eventually lead to more legislator divergence from the median. These competing expectations are tested by examining candidate convergence data from the 1996 U.S. House elections and data on senator divergence from their states’ median voters during the 104
th
-107
th
Congresses. One key
contribution of this paper is the creation of ideal point estimates of legislators and constituency medians on a common scale using MCMC ideal point estimation techniques. The findings are that valence theories are demonstrated when examining incumbent divergence from the constituency median, though these theories are not demonstrated when examining candidate divergence from one another. In addition, we also find that the extent of project outlays (though not deviation from the constituency median) is related to the margin of victory for legislators. The deviation from the constituency median, and not the extent of project outlays, is directly related to the likelihood of winning.
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Paper prepared for the 2004 meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, Sept. 2-5, 2004. We would like to thank Stephen Gent and Gail McElroy for helpful suggestions and Jim Snyder for providing data on the 1996 House elections. We also thank Sam Wiltzius for providing computing resources. Byström’s and Haté’s contribution to this paper is the U.S. House statistical model. Grose’s contributions to this paper are the U.S. senate statistical models and the senate-state ideal point estimates.
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| | Authors: Grose, Christian. |
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Valence Advantages, “Pork” Projects, and Position-taking in the U.S. Congress
Christian R. Grose
Lawrence University
Box 599
Appleton, WI 54911
920-993-6273
christian.## email not listed ##
Åsa Byström
Lawrence University
Ashe N. Haté
Lawrence University
Abstract: Does the allocation of “pork” projects to constituents affect legislative position-taking?
Are legislators who deliver substantial amounts of federal largesse more likely to diverge from
their campaign opponents and from their constituency medians? Three competing, though
overlapping, literatures are examined in this paper: valence theories of position-taking, trust
theories of position-taking, and marginality theories of position-taking. These three literatures
lead to competing predictions in terms of the extent that legislators deviate from their
constituencies and diverge from their campaign opponents given the extent of valence advantages
available to incumbents. Examples of valence advantages are numerous (e.g., charisma,
constituency service), though we measure an incumbent’s valence advantage as the extent of
federal project outlays distributed to a legislator’s constituency. The marginality hypothesis
suggests a linear and negative relationship between project allocations and legislator deviation
from the district. The trust hypothesis also suggests a linear relationship, though in a positive
direction. The valence hypothesis suggests a nonlinear relationship, where increased levels of
project allocations at first lead to more legislator convergence toward the median, but eventually
lead to more legislator divergence from the median. These competing expectations are tested by
examining candidate convergence data from the 1996 U.S. House elections and data on senator
divergence from their states’ median voters during the 104
th
-107
th
Congresses. One key
contribution of this paper is the creation of ideal point estimates of legislators and constituency
medians on a common scale using MCMC ideal point estimation techniques. The findings are
that valence theories are demonstrated when examining incumbent divergence from the
constituency median, though these theories are not demonstrated when examining candidate
divergence from one another. In addition, we also find that the extent of project outlays (though
not deviation from the constituency median) is related to the margin of victory for legislators.
The deviation from the constituency median, and not the extent of project outlays, is directly
related to the likelihood of winning.
_______________________
Paper prepared for the 2004 meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, Sept. 2-5,
2004. We would like to thank Stephen Gent and Gail McElroy for helpful suggestions and Jim Snyder for
providing data on the 1996 House elections. We also thank Sam Wiltzius for providing computing
resources. Byström’s and Haté’s contribution to this paper is the U.S. House statistical model. Grose’s
contributions to this paper are the U.S. senate statistical models and the senate-state ideal point estimates.
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