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predictions from the literatures on congressional representation, incumbency advantage,
and valence theories of positioning present a clear puzzle worth examining. Why are the
predictions of these three overlapping literatures (representation, incumbency advantage,
and valence theories) at odds with one another? We test these competing predictions in
this paper with data on 1996 U.S. House elections and senate-state legislator divergence
data from 1996-2002. We find that the valence advantage and representation theories are
demonstrated with the senate data, though the incumbency advantage literature is
supported with the House election data.
Theoretical and Empirical Research on Position-taking and Valence Advantages
Three competing, though overlapping, literatures are examined in this paper:
valence theories of position-taking, trust theories of position-taking, and marginality
theories of position-taking. These three literatures lead to competing predictions in terms
of the extent that legislators deviate from their constituencies and diverge from their
campaign opponents. Figure 1 details the expectations of these competing theories.
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
Since Downs (1957) formulated the spatial model as it applies to politics, a
substantial body of research has explored how the predictions of the spatial model change
under different conditions. Generally, the Downsian model predicts some degree of
moderation even as assumptions about the number of dimensions, the amount of
information available to candidates and voters, the proportion of swing voters in the
electorate, and the kind of motivations driving candidates are relaxed (Sullivan and
Minns 1976; Enelow and Hinich 1981; Hinich and Pollard 1981; Enelow and Hinich
1982; Calvert 1985).
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