4
On model-building by analogy, see Morris (1970). See also Black (1950), Katzner
(1969, 1992), Pribram (1953), Richardson (1991), Russett (1966), and Sebba (1953).
5
As Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson put it, “[c]itizens are consumers of government”
(2001: 16).
2
axis. A truncated support function or schedule S slopes down and to the right, encapsulating the
model’s key hypothesis: ceteris paribus, as F increases VOTE2 falls. That is, the greater the
share of the economy flowing through the federal government, the smaller the proportion of the
electorate that is willing to grant the incumbents another term in the White House.
Lg Figure 1
The theoretical justification for this hypothesis rests on an analogy with economics. F is
interpreted as the equivalent of a “price” or a fiscal “fee” which Washington charges the
economy for the federal bundle of goods and services.
4
Metaphorically, on election day the
incumbent party, of which the president is the chairman of the board and chief executive officer,
has its “contract” to manage the federal government up for renewal. Much like consumers, the
voters’ willingness to grant the governing party another term depends on the fiscal fee being
charged.
5
Ceteris paribus, as this rate goes up, more and more voters refuse to reelect the
incumbents, casting their ballots, instead, for the opposition party. If spending has grown
beyond what a majority of the electorate is willing to support with their votes, the incumbents
Convention