7
See, inter alia, Ferris and West (1996), Berry and Lowery (1987), Lewis-Beck and
Rice (1985), and Peacock and Wiseman (1961).
4
opposite effect: the support function would rotate downward, assuming a more vertical angle
with respect to the x-axis, which implies that even marginal increases in spending would be
punished severely by the voters. Thus, although always negative, the slope of the support
schedule (dV/dF) becomes more or less steep in response to random shocks, short-term
disturbances, or slower changes in voter sensitivity to the size of the fiscal “fee” charged for the
federal bundle of goods and services.
Lg. Figure 2
Also, it is important to keep in mind that the support function may shift forward or
backward as voters’ desires or evaluations of the quantity and quality of what Washington
provides go up or down in response to demographic, social, international, ideological, or some
other exogenous change.
7
This is shown in Figure 2. Assume the starting point to be F*
1
in
period t
1
. Assume, further, that in the next period the public, believing that the benefits of the
goods and services provided by the federal government exceed their cost, is willing to support
additional spending to obtain them. In the model, this is represented by a forward shift in the
support function, from S
1
to S
2
, where it intersects the 50 percent plus one victory threshold
Convention