39
the nation was, to be sure, a question of not fearing fear itself – of moral leadership – but
of administrative leadership as well. Tools of management were what FDR needed; as he
mused to Brownlow in 1936, if Roosevelt had run in Alf Landon’s place that year as the
Republican candidate for president, “I would say: ‘I am for social security, work relief,
etc., etc., but the Democrats cannot be entrusted with the administration of these fine
ideals.’”
70
Using institutional, rather than political, resources for shoring up presidential
control over executive management was also made relatively more attractive by several
other factors. First, it combined with politicization: the influx of New Deal appointees
into the federal bureaucracy – many of them locked into position through the subsequent
expansion of civil service coverage -- made utilizing governmental mechanisms a
palatable means of solving public problems. Further, in an era of “institutionalized
pluralism,” to borrow Samuel Kernell’s phrase, before the dominance of primary
nominations and candidate-centered campaigning, Roosevelt was somewhat more
insulated from the partisan pressures that afflicted his successors serving during today’s
“permanent campaign.”
71
In addition to strategic considerations, Roosevelt had a better
understanding of the inner workings of the federal government than did any of his
modern successors, and this may have given him a greater appreciation of the benefits
that would accrue to him politically by strengthening his managerial capacity. As Smith
frequently noted, “the knowledge of the details of the Federal establishment on the part of
the President impressed me… as being nothing short of amazing.”
72
70
Cited in Dickinson Bitter Harvest, 82 (footnote 136).
71
Samuel Kernell, Going Public, 3
rd
ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1997); Norman Ornstein and Thomas
Mann, eds., The Permanent Campaign and its Future (Washington, DC: AEI Press, 2000).
72
Smith diary, 4/26/39
Convention