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SOFT EUROPEANIZATION?: THE INFLUENCE OF THE EUROPEAN EMPLOYMENT STRATEGY IN PROCESSES AND EMPLOYMENT POLICIES IN EU MEMBER STATES
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3
diverges from traditional forms of EU governance, i.e., regulations, decisions, and directives,
3
by
leaving ultimate responsibility for labor market policy in the hands of member States. The non-binding instrument is based on the idea that member States voluntarily act as enforcers and implementers of the strategy. This EU development could be interpreted by some as a disruption of member States’ labor market policies and institutions. Furthermore, some have argued that the pressure from Europe is too ‘soft’ to be felt by national and sub-national institutions, policies, and actors. The development of a ‘supranational social dimension’ begs the following question: what has been the effect the European Employment Strategy on member States’ labor market policy making processes, policies and institutions? This paper proposes a theoretical framework to understand how the EES influences policy-making processes on member States. The argument draws on ‘a policy process framework.’
4
This methodology allows for the identification of
national changes, such as the inclusion of a policy item in the agenda and/or policy (re)formulation. The goal of this paper is not to analyze whether the ‘European treatment’ is effective, but how and when it operates on the ground. To sustain and illustrate my argument, I present data from interviews conducted with policy-makers, civil servants, trade unionists, and members of peak employers’ organizations in the European Union, Sweden, Spain and Belgium. Moreover, I show data from recent structural and policy developments in fifteen European member States.
5
These data show the potential effects of the European strategy on domestic
settings. This paper seeks to expand the literature on ‘Europeanization’ of domestic configurations by providing a theoretical framework to analyze how non-binding measures affect policy-making processes in member State. It attempts to contribute to the policy-making literature by trying to
3
EU ‘hard law’ may take different forms. At this point, it is important to make a distinction between some
of the different legal instruments used by the EU-- “Regulations which are directly applicable and binding in all EU Member States without the need for any national implementing legislation. Directives that bind Member States as to the objectives to be achieved within a certain time limit while leaving the national authorities the choice of form and means to be used. Directives have to be implemented in national legislation in accordance with the procedures of the individual Member States. Decisions are binding in all their aspects for those to whom they are addressed. Thus, decisions do not require national implementing legislation. A decision may be addressed to any or all Member States, to enterprises or to individuals” (Eur-Lex,
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/about/pap/process_and_players2.html
, accessed on February 4,
2004).
4
This analytical approach is compatible with the “metaphor of Europeanization as a continuum” (Radaelli,
2003, p. 32).
5
I have chosen my cases using a ‘most different system design’ methodology. This choice is grounded on
the empirical findings of the literature on implementation of hard
law measures
. This body of work
points out that the ‘fit between EU measures and domestic institutions matter’ when explaining compliance with EU hard law. Thus, for this comparative research project, I have taken the former empirical finding as baseline, and I choose three countries with different levels of ‘misfit,’ the level of compatibility between supranational directives and national institutions (high, medium and low), and with different types of labor market institutions (welfare regimes). Moreover, I wanted to look at a Southern case, a Continental case, and a Scandinavian case to analyze if the European Employment Strategy affects member States differently (or not), given their domestic institutions. Each of these countries represent one of these ‘values’—one with high levels of misfit and a Southern welfare regime (Spain), one with medium levels of misfit and a Continental welfare regime (Belgium), and finally one with low levels of misfit and Scandinavian welfare regime (Sweden).
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| | Authors: Lopez-Santana, Mariely. |
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3
diverges from traditional forms of EU governance, i.e., regulations, decisions, and directives,
3
by
leaving ultimate responsibility for labor market policy in the hands of member States. The non-
binding instrument is based on the idea that member States voluntarily act as enforcers and
implementers of the strategy. This EU development could be interpreted by some as a disruption
of member States’ labor market policies and institutions. Furthermore, some have argued that the
pressure from Europe is too ‘soft’ to be felt by national and sub-national institutions, policies, and
actors.
The development of a ‘supranational social dimension’ begs the following question: what has
been the effect the European Employment Strategy on member States’ labor market policy
making processes, policies and institutions? This paper proposes a theoretical framework to
understand how the EES influences policy-making processes on member States. The argument
draws on ‘a policy process framework.’
4
This methodology allows for the identification of
national changes, such as the inclusion of a policy item in the agenda and/or policy
(re)formulation. The goal of this paper is not to analyze whether the ‘European treatment’ is
effective, but how and when it operates on the ground. To sustain and illustrate my argument, I
present data from interviews conducted with policy-makers, civil servants, trade unionists, and
members of peak employers’ organizations in the European Union, Sweden, Spain and Belgium.
Moreover, I show data from recent structural and policy developments in fifteen European
member States.
5
These data show the potential effects of the European strategy on domestic
settings.
This paper seeks to expand the literature on ‘Europeanization’ of domestic configurations by
providing a theoretical framework to analyze how non-binding measures affect policy-making
processes in member State. It attempts to contribute to the policy-making literature by trying to
3
EU ‘hard law’ may take different forms. At this point, it is important to make a distinction between some
of the different legal instruments used by the EU-- “Regulations which are directly applicable and binding
in all EU Member States without the need for any national implementing legislation. Directives that bind
Member States as to the objectives to be achieved within a certain time limit while leaving the national
authorities the choice of form and means to be used. Directives have to be implemented in national
legislation in accordance with the procedures of the individual Member States. Decisions are binding in all
their aspects for those to whom they are addressed. Thus, decisions do not require national implementing
legislation. A decision may be addressed to any or all Member States, to enterprises or to individuals”
(Eur-Lex,
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/about/pap/process_and_players2.html
, accessed on February 4,
2004).
4
This analytical approach is compatible with the “metaphor of Europeanization as a continuum” (Radaelli,
2003, p. 32).
5
I have chosen my cases using a ‘most different system design’ methodology. This choice is grounded on
the empirical findings of the literature on implementation of hard
law measures
. This body of work
points out that the ‘fit between EU measures and domestic institutions matter’ when explaining compliance
with EU hard law. Thus, for this comparative research project, I have taken the former empirical finding as
baseline, and I choose three countries with different levels of ‘misfit,’ the level of compatibility between
supranational directives and national institutions (high, medium and low), and with different types of labor
market institutions (welfare regimes). Moreover, I wanted to look at a Southern case, a Continental case,
and a Scandinavian case to analyze if the European Employment Strategy affects member States differently
(or not), given their domestic institutions. Each of these countries represent one of these ‘values’—one
with high levels of misfit and a Southern welfare regime (Spain), one with medium levels of misfit and a
Continental welfare regime (Belgium), and finally one with low levels of misfit and Scandinavian welfare
regime (Sweden).
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