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THE CONGRESS, INTEREST GROUPS, AND PUBLIC POLICY: |
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Abstract:
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In this paper we begin the inquiry into an congressional-interest group relationship and its impact on public policy looking at one example in health policy. We argue that Congress is in the driver’s seat in the relationship with interest groups and that it is in Members’ best interest to take small, incremental policy steps, often seemingly against interest group preferences, with the idea that such actions will garner additional “rent” from the groups in future years. Members simply don’t benefit adequately from “solving” a problem; they benefit most from partially solving the problem (enough to take credit for solving it) but then quietly returning to the table at a later time when more interest group rent can be extracted. In this paper we analyze Medicare provider payments between 1997 and 2003—a time when the Congress first “took away” resources from interests and then slowly gave them back as an example of how Congress can successfully extract rent and, with the help of groups, justify why their action is good public policy. |
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group (129), interest (120), health (89), congress (68), provid (60), member (57), medicar (53), polit (50), congression (50), home (45), plan (41), payment (41), rent (40), billion (37), bill (37), year (37), polici (34), 1998 (34), contribut (32), carey (31), care (30), |
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Association:
Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
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Citation:
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MLA Citation:
| Weissert, William. and Weissert, Carol. "THE CONGRESS, INTEREST GROUPS, AND PUBLIC POLICY:" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hilton Chicago and the Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL, Sep 02, 2004 <Not Available>. 2009-05-26 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p60428_index.html> |
APA Citation:
| Weissert, W. and Weissert, C. S. , 2004-09-02 "THE CONGRESS, INTEREST GROUPS, AND PUBLIC POLICY:" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hilton Chicago and the Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL Online <.PDF>. 2009-05-26 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p60428_index.html |
Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Review Method: Peer Reviewed Abstract: In this paper we begin the inquiry into an congressional-interest group relationship and its impact on public policy looking at one example in health policy. We argue that Congress is in the driver’s seat in the relationship with interest groups and that it is in Members’ best interest to take small, incremental policy steps, often seemingly against interest group preferences, with the idea that such actions will garner additional “rent” from the groups in future years. Members simply don’t benefit adequately from “solving” a problem; they benefit most from partially solving the problem (enough to take credit for solving it) but then quietly returning to the table at a later time when more interest group rent can be extracted. In this paper we analyze Medicare provider payments between 1997 and 2003—a time when the Congress first “took away” resources from interests and then slowly gave them back as an example of how Congress can successfully extract rent and, with the help of groups, justify why their action is good public policy. |
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| Document Type: |
.PDF |
| Page count: |
36 |
| Word count: |
9473 |
| Text sample: |
| THE CONGRESS INTEREST GROUPS AND PUBLIC POLICY: WHY A LITTLE IS BETTER THAN A LOT CAROL S. WEISSERT WILLIAM G. WEISSERT DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY 226 BELLAMY BUILDING TALLAHASSEE FL 32306-2230 cweisser@fsu.edu wweisser@fsu.edu Prepared for Delivery at the 2004 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association Chicago IL Sept. 2-5 2004 The Congress Interest Groups and Public Policy: Why A Little is Better than A Lot In this paper we begin the inquiry into an |
| Health Professionals $8 000 000 Health Services $6 000 000 Pharmaceuticals /Health Products Hospitals $4 000 000 Nursing Homes $2 000 000 $0 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 SOURCE: Open Secrets |
Similar Titles:
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