The Congress, Interest Groups and Public Policy: Why A Little is Better than A Lot
Political scientists have long studied the role of interest groups on public policy and
politicians. Sometimes their lobbying is viewed fairly benignly. More recently, research has
highlighted the cut-throat—and effective—nature of lobbying. That nature has changed
substantially over the past few years. In addition to inside and outside lobbying, interest groups
are now using modern technology to link constituents and Members in new and innovative ways.
They are also spending millions on advertising campaigns aimed at informing both citizens and
their elected representatives.
The linkage between contributions and votes has been well-studied but is still
inconclusive. Research is made more difficult by the recognition that resources of interest groups
go far beyond contributions and include organization of constituents, soft money, trips, even
naming a university endowed chair in the Member’s name.
Another important strain of research deals with what has been called congressional
gridlock or the inability of Congress and the President to enact important legislation.
Interestingly, interest groups have not generally been fingered as culpable here—and one author
who did explore the relationship found little to suggest that more groups led to more gridlock
(Berry 2002)
In this paper we will build on this research on interest groups, Congress, and policy
choices to argue that in some cases the focus on the interest group-Congress relationship has
been misdirected. Instead of looking at the interest groups, particularly as rent-seekers as our
economist colleagues call them, we should on some issues be looking at the Congress as the key
Convention