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wield considerable power over the fate of judicial confirmations. However, the use of holds in
relation to judicial confirmations is almost entirely overlooked. It is unknown how often they are
used, to whom they are applied, and how long each hold lasts. Furthermore, a key question
remains unanswered: Why do senators use holds to block judicial confirmations? Conventional
wisdom maintains that senators obstruct and delay those confirmations that they find
ideologically objectionable, using whatever means available. But, this assumption is based upon
a view of the judicial confirmation process as an interest group and ideologically-driven process.
This paper examines when and why holds are used to block judicial confirmations. By looking
closely at each instance of a hold and the reason behind each hold, we can construct a more
accurate and comprehensive picture of the judicial confirmation process and the different
confirmation environments that nominees might face.
This paper begins its analysis of the “hold” by examining the historical use of holds and
its present-day incarnation. It then investigates all holds that have been applied to Circuit Court
nominees between 1987-2002 (100
th
-107
th
Congresses), and assesses their application as well as
the underlying reason for each usage. Surprisingly, it finds that much of the delay and
obstruction which mark the modern-day lower court confirmation process is not due to
ideological opposition but rather is a function of nominees being used as bargaining tools in
unrelated disputes.
THE INCREASING DELAY OF JUDICIAL CONFIRMATIONS
Current scholars of federal judicial confirmations have turned their attention to exploring
and explaining the delay that increasingly characterizes the federal court confirmation process.
Recent works have shown that it is taking longer and longer for judicial nominees to be
Convention