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The Consequence of Contribution Limits on Political Party Contributions in Gubernatorial Elections

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Abstract:

Political parties have used hard money, soft money, and/or issue advocacy to strengthen party building. But, as soft money and issue advocacy expenditures began to explode, concerns over both the source of these monies and their continued growth helped lead to the passage of Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002. Contribution limits on party contributions, however, remained relatively unchanged under the new law. In this paper we examine what might be gained or lost if contribution limits on party contributions are changed. We examine 88 gubernatorial elections from 1995 to 2002 in 50 states. Analyses of the total dollar amount of party contributions suggest that less restrictive party contribution limits result in political parties being more likely to contribute higher dollar amounts to candidates. This pattern is enhanced when political parties perceive that their contributions are likely to have a greater impact, i.e., in a competitive election. In addition, analyses of the candidates’ reliance on party contributions are supportive of a similar pattern; less restrictive party contribution limits result in candidates being more likely to rely on party contributions, especially when the election becomes competitive. Findings presented in this paper clearly suggest that the financial role of political parties in an election can be enhanced or diminished by making adjustments in the level of political party campaign contribution limits.

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parti (255), contribut (199), limit (163), candid (118), polit (89), money (77), state (73), variabl (71), competit (64), elect (61), model (54), elector (52), campaign (40), 1 (40), signific (35), amount (35), effect (30), statist (30), soft (29), like (29), incumb (27),
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Name: American Political Science Association
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http://www.apsanet.org


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MLA Citation:

Eom, Kihong. "The Consequence of Contribution Limits on Political Party Contributions in Gubernatorial Elections" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hilton Chicago and the Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL, Sep 02, 2004 <Not Available>. 2009-05-26 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p60536_index.html>

APA Citation:

Eom, K. , 2004-09-02 "The Consequence of Contribution Limits on Political Party Contributions in Gubernatorial Elections" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hilton Chicago and the Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL Online <.PDF>. 2009-05-26 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p60536_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Political parties have used hard money, soft money, and/or issue advocacy to strengthen party building. But, as soft money and issue advocacy expenditures began to explode, concerns over both the source of these monies and their continued growth helped lead to the passage of Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002. Contribution limits on party contributions, however, remained relatively unchanged under the new law. In this paper we examine what might be gained or lost if contribution limits on party contributions are changed. We examine 88 gubernatorial elections from 1995 to 2002 in 50 states. Analyses of the total dollar amount of party contributions suggest that less restrictive party contribution limits result in political parties being more likely to contribute higher dollar amounts to candidates. This pattern is enhanced when political parties perceive that their contributions are likely to have a greater impact, i.e., in a competitive election. In addition, analyses of the candidates’ reliance on party contributions are supportive of a similar pattern; less restrictive party contribution limits result in candidates being more likely to rely on party contributions, especially when the election becomes competitive. Findings presented in this paper clearly suggest that the financial role of political parties in an election can be enhanced or diminished by making adjustments in the level of political party campaign contribution limits.

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Associated Document Available American Political Science Association
Associated Document Available Political Research Online

Document Type: .pdf
Page count: 29
Word count: 7819
Text sample:
The Consequence of Contribution Limits on Political Party Contributions in Gubernatorial Elections By Kihong Eom Iowa State University Donald A. Gross* University of Kentucky Paper Prepared for the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association Chicago IL September 2 ­ 5 2004. * Kihong Eom Lecturer Department of Political Science Iowa State University Ames IA 50010 (kheom@iastate.edu). Donald A. Gross Professor Department of Political Science University of Kentucky Lexington KY 40506 (pol146@uky.edu). We thank the Institute on Money
(4.101) (4.379) (3.972) (4.237) President 5.354 5.515 6.459 6.555 (5.977) (5.965) (5.948) (5.892) Constant -23.703** -25.457** -30.229*** -31.162*** (11.226) (11.931) (11.517) (12.015) N 176 176 176 176 R-squared/Log Likelihood 0.23 0.24 -201.659 -201.626 Robust standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 28


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