(Page 39 of 43) - Urban Regimes and Community Empowerment: Lessons from the Empowerment Zones in Atlanta and Baltimore authored by Stoker, Robert.

implementation of federal urban initiatives from the EZ experience in Atlanta and Baltimore
(and elsewhere), we believe three warrant special emphasis.

First, governance matters. Atlanta failed and Baltimore succeeded largely due to the

strength and diversity of the policy regimes constructed to oversee their EZ initiatives. In
Atlanta, the regime had little breadth or depth and did not extend significantly beyond the
mayor’s inner circle. Hence, business involvement was nearly nonexistent, nonprofit
organizations—both citywide and neighborhood—played a minor role at the start and were
essentially absent at the end, and government participation was largely limited to city agencies
that the mayor directly controlled. Hence, the art of governance—building consensus across a
diverse group of interests, mobilizing the resources needed to pursue a shared vision, and tapping
the expertise of agencies to take the actions needed to execute that vision never materialized in
Atlanta. In Baltimore considerable attention was paid to governance. The EBMC Board was
composed to bring influential members of the city’s business and philanthropic community into
the governance process. This reduced the influence of zone residents on the priorities of the
program, but the leadership at EBMC viewed zone residents as important participants in zone
initiatives and devoted considerable time and resources to developing their potential. Over time
a consensus emerged that allowed the community to pursue a common vision in implementing its
programs.

Second, institutions matter. Atlanta had a weak policy regime in large part because it had

weak institutions. It lacked a set of well-established revitalization agencies that could bring
representatives of the various sectors together as well as agencies capable of completing the tasks
needed to revitalize neighborhoods—e.g., manage revolving loan funds for business investment,
job creation, and affordable housing; design and administer employment and training programs.
Baltimore, on the other hand, enjoyed the experience and expertise of its leading EBMC Board
members who were instrumental in designing and managing zone programs. By working
cooperatively with city agencies and non-profits, EBMC managed the process while retaining its
flexibility to use its resources effectively as they learned about program performance and new
opportunities emerged.

Third, capacity building is critical for neighborhood transformation to succeed. Atlanta

had weak institutions—public, quasi-public, nonprofit—largely because the city had never
invested in the creation of strong institutions capable of fostering neighborhood revitalization,
largely out of fear that strong institutions—particularly neighborhood-based institutions—would
provide a serious countervailing force that would diminish the control city hall (i.e., the mayor)
could exercise over federal urban revitalization resources. Baltimore, in contrast, took capacity
building seriously. Indeed, Empower Baltimore Management Corporation invested significant
time, energy, and money to develop community-based institutions. Although the results are
mixed, the positive story in Baltimore is that widespread community participation can coexist
with the development and implementation of effective policies.