Author's Keywords: electoral systems, PR, electoral accountability, government responsiveness	Convention All Academic Convention is the premier solution for your association's abstract management solutions needs. Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! Click here for more information.
Association: Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p60667_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Vowles, Jack. "Getting Rid of Rascals at Elections: A Comparison of Plurality and Proportional Systems" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hilton Chicago and the Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL, Sep 02, 2004 <Not Available>. 2009-05-26 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p60667_index.html>

Vowles, J. , 2004-09-02 "Getting Rid of Rascals at Elections: A Comparison of Plurality and Proportional Systems" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hilton Chicago and the Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL Online <.PDF>. 2009-05-26 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p60667_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Review Method: Peer Reviewed Abstract: Many conversant with the electoral systems literature would agree with the following statement: ‘it is easier for voters in a plurality system to get rid of a government they do not like; they just throw the rascals out and replace them with a new government’ (Blais and Massicote 1996, 73; also see Popper 1987, 1988). However, this assumption that government dismissal is easier under plurality rules than under proportional representation has been given relatively scant empirical scrutiny. This paper outlines and critiques the theoretical foundations of the claim in the democratic elitism of Schumpeter and Popper. Analysis of data from 18 parliamentary democracies with more than twenty years of continuous democracy finds some of the effects hypothesised, but they are weaker and less consistent than expected. In these terms the electoral accountability of governments under proportional representation appears very little different from that under simple member plurality electoral systems.

Media Effects on Vote for Governing Parties: The Role of Media Bias and Fluidity of the Political Context Among European Countries

The Effects of Electoral Reform on the Belgian Party System: Strategic Adaptation at the Voter and the Party Elite Level

Media effects on the vote for governing parties: The role of media bias and fluidity of the political context across European countries