ABSTRACT
Many conversant with the electoral systems literature would agree with the following
statement: ‘it is easier for voters in a plurality system to get rid of a government they do not
like; they just throw the rascals out and replace them with a new government’ (Blais and
Massicote 1996, 73; also see Popper 1987, 1988). However, this assumption that
government dismissal is easier under plurality rules than under proportional representation
has been given relatively scant empirical scrutiny. This paper outlines and critiques the
theoretical foundations of the claim in the democratic elitism of Schumpeter and Popper.
Analysis of data from 18 parliamentary democracies with more than twenty years of
continuous democracy finds some of the effects hypothesised, but they are weaker and less
consistent than expected. In these terms the electoral accountability of governments under
proportional representation appears very little different from that under simple member
plurality electoral systems.
Convention