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Getting Rid of Rascals at Elections: A Comparison of Plurality and Proportional Systems
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NOTES
1
This is calculated for each election as 1 divided by the sum of the squares of the
proportional shares of votes cast for each party.
2
As Rose and Mackie put it ‘the whole idea of a general election as a test of the
popularity of government can be seen as a relatively restricted concept, primarily meaningful in Anglo-American countries...’ (Rose and Mackie, 1983, 129).
3
Sources include Mackie and Rose 1991, 1997, Nohlen, Thibaut, and Krennerich 1999,
Lane, McKay, and Newton 1991, Woldendorp, Keman, and Budge 1993, Woldendorp, Keman, and Budge 2000, and the annual data yearbook issues of the European Journal of Political Research. Where necessary, the most recent Cabinet data was found in Keesing’s Record of World Events (London: Longman, 1987-). I am grateful to the Electoral Commissions of Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Botswana for sending me data for their countries, and to Arend Lijphart for letting me share his unpublished data on India (see also Lijphart, 1994, 169-172). India presents a particularly complex challenge for the compilation of this data. For this reason, the series currently ends in 1998.
4
New elections confirmed vote and seat majorities for the Canadian Conservatives in
1958, and for British Labour later in 1974. The Canadian Conservatives won in seats but not votes in June 1979 but lost a subsequent election in March 1980.
5
Among the examples are the British Liberals, the Canadian NDP, and the German
FDP. The analysis also finds that in terms of policy influence ‘a multi-party system with loose coalitions appears to be a sufficient, but not a necessary, condition for low accountability’ (Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge 1994, 269)
6
An alternative fixed effects model also showed no significant PR effect, but the
interactions with shares and shifts did identify somewhat stronger SMP effects, together with a much more negative effect for the effective number of parties under SMP. However, the model presented tolerance problems, and was judged somewhat less robust than the alternative reported.
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NOTES
1
This is calculated for each election as 1 divided by the sum of the squares of the
proportional shares of votes cast for each party.
2
As Rose and Mackie put it ‘the whole idea of a general election as a test of the
popularity of government can be seen as a relatively restricted concept, primarily
meaningful in Anglo-American countries...’ (Rose and Mackie, 1983, 129).
3
Sources include Mackie and Rose 1991, 1997, Nohlen, Thibaut, and Krennerich 1999,
Lane, McKay, and Newton 1991, Woldendorp, Keman, and Budge 1993, Woldendorp,
Keman, and Budge 2000, and the annual data yearbook issues of the European Journal
of Political Research. Where necessary, the most recent Cabinet data was found in
Keesing’s Record of World Events (London: Longman, 1987-). I am grateful to the
Electoral Commissions of Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Botswana for sending me
data for their countries, and to Arend Lijphart for letting me share his unpublished data
on India (see also Lijphart, 1994, 169-172). India presents a particularly complex
challenge for the compilation of this data. For this reason, the series currently ends in
1998.
4
New elections confirmed vote and seat majorities for the Canadian Conservatives in
1958, and for British Labour later in 1974. The Canadian Conservatives won in seats
but not votes in June 1979 but lost a subsequent election in March 1980.
5
Among the examples are the British Liberals, the Canadian NDP, and the German
FDP. The analysis also finds that in terms of policy influence ‘a multi-party system with
loose coalitions appears to be a sufficient, but not a necessary, condition for low
accountability’ (Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge 1994, 269)
6
An alternative fixed effects model also showed no significant PR effect, but the
interactions with shares and shifts did identify somewhat stronger SMP effects, together
with a much more negative effect for the effective number of parties under SMP.
However, the model presented tolerance problems, and was judged somewhat less
robust than the alternative reported.
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