Author's Keywords: administrative procedures, Taiwanese politics, bureacratic reform, presidency	Convention Submission, Review, and Scheduling! All Academic Convention can help with all of your abstract management needs and many more. Contact us today for a quote! Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! Click here for more information.
Association: Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p60685_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Baum, Jeeyang. "Decline of Kuomintang (KMT) Electoral Dominance, Factional Conflict and Bureaucratic Reforms in Taiwan" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hilton Chicago and the Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL, Sep 02, 2004 <Not Available>. 2009-05-26 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p60685_index.html>

Baum, J. , 2004-09-02 "Decline of Kuomintang (KMT) Electoral Dominance, Factional Conflict and Bureaucratic Reforms in Taiwan" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hilton Chicago and the Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL Online <.PDF>. 2009-05-26 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p60685_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Review Method: Peer Reviewed Abstract: To date, scholars have paid great attention to understanding the variation in electoral rules and elections in new democracies. There has been less focus on how electoral rules and elections, over time, affect the composition of the executive branch and thus the nature of government policies in new democracies. During the past decade, several of the world’s well-known one-party dominant systems lost control of their governments. Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Mexico’s Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), and Taiwan’s Kuomintang Party (KMT) all lost effective control of their governments. This paper focuses on Taiwan and links the KMT’s decline in electoral performance directly to its ability to control the executive branch. Taiwan recently adopted a series of administrative reform laws, designed to make the bureaucracy more transparent and allow public participation in regulatory policies. The passage of these laws begs the question why chief executives support administrative procedural reforms that are designed to slow down and impose extra costs on the implementation of their policies? Theoretically, any executive -- either a president or a cabinet minister -- can have control problems within his own branch. In Taiwan, the declining electoral performance of the KMT meant that there was an increased threat of a successful no confidence vote against the KMT government. So, to shore up his position within the party, President Lee Teng-hui found it necessary to appoint ministers from a rival faction within the KMT, whose members favored more anti-corruption reforms than his faction. Consequently, the rival faction ministers confronted entrenched bureaucrats loyal to Lee, while Lee found himself in conflict with those same ministers, who he had been forced to appoint. These reformist ministers had an incentive to manage delegation to Lee’s bureaucracy. At the same time, Lee had an incentive to limit the power of the rival faction ministers. Administrative procedures designed to open up the bureaucracy to the public could serve both of these goals. Archival data, secondary sources, and interviews with key presidential advisors, senior career bureaucrats, and politicians confirm my hypothesis.

Explaining Agency Budget Choices: Are Disciplined Decisions (Actual Requests) Affected More by Administrator’s Aspirations (Decision Premises) or by Political Principals’ Priorities (Executive-Legislative Preferences)?

Political Competition in Redistributive Social Policy Legislation: Evidence from GermanWelfare Reforms 1950 – 2000