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Giving a Little to Get a Little: A Bargaining Model of Interest Group Coalition Formation

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Name: American Political Science Association
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MLA Citation:

Holyoke, Thomas. "Giving a Little to Get a Little: A Bargaining Model of Interest Group Coalition Formation" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hilton Chicago and the Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL, Sep 02, 2004 <Not Available>. 2009-05-26 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p60698_index.html>

APA Citation:

Holyoke, T. , 2004-09-02 "Giving a Little to Get a Little: A Bargaining Model of Interest Group Coalition Formation" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hilton Chicago and the Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL Online <.PDF>. 2009-05-26 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p60698_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed

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Document Type: .PDF
Page count: 45
Word count: 11227
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Giving a Little to Get a Little: A Bargaining Model of Interest Group Coalition Formation Thomas T. Holyoke Department of Political Science Hastings College 800 Turner Avenue Hastings Nebraska 68901-7696 1-(402)-461-7323 tholyoke@hastings.edu September 2004 Prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association Chicago Illinois 2004. The author would like to thank the Centennial Center at the American Political Science Association which provided the scholarship and therefore the time and resources permitting me to write
More Groups Less Clout." In The New American Political System 2nd Ed. Anthony J. King ed. Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute. Schelling Thomas C. 1960. Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Schlozman Kay Lehman and John T. Tierney. 1986. Organized Interests and American Democracy. Truman David B. 1951. The Governmental Process. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Von Neumann John and Oskar Morgenstern. 1944. The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Wilson James Q. 1973.


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