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Degrees and Patterns of Party Competition in Electoral Autocracies
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The paper examines patterns of party-systemic competitiveness under electoral authoritarianism – that is, under regimes that deploy regular multiparty elections not as instruments democracy, but of authoritarian rule. According to much of the literature, electoral authoritarian regimes display dramatic difference in party-systemic competitiveness. While “competitive” autocracies score high, “hegemonic” regimes score very low on this dimension. The present paper shares this initial assumption, yet proposes new venues for measuring and conceptualizing levels of competitiveness among electoral autocracies.
Our sample is formed by 58 concurrent elections held in either electoral autocracies or electoral democracies around the world between 1980 and 2002. In a first step, we compare mean levels of competitiveness across levels of freedom as measured by average Freedom House scores. In a second step, we introduce a new strategy of measuring and classifying subtypes of electoral authoritarianism. Instead of relying on single indicators and predefined thresholds, we classify our cases through the “inductive” technique of cluster analysis on the basis of multiple indicators of party-systemic competitiveness.
The External Boundaries of Electoral Authoritarianism
Most contemporary regimes in the so-called developing world organize regular elections. In many of them, however, elections do not serve as “instruments of democracy” (Powell 2000) but as instruments of authoritarian rule. According to one gross estimate, about two fifths of all developing countries qualify as electoral autocracies. Such regimes hold regular multiparty elections but violate democratic principles in severe and systematic ways (Schedler 2002b). On their democratic side, electoral autocracies share borders with electoral democracies; on their authoritarian side, they share borders with closed autocracies. Electoral democracies conduct free and fair elections, but lack other elements of liberal constitutional democracy (such as bureaucratic integrity and an impartial judiciary). Closed autocracies either do not hold multiparty elections for the chief executive, or if they do, conduct them in a climate of repression that does not allow for more than the ritualistic participation of nominal opposition parties.
The 58 concurrent elections which are to be examined in the present paper are selected from a previously demarcated universe of electoral autocracies and democracies. In order to identify electoral autocracies, I relied, for a first cut and in the absence of better alternatives, on Freedom House data (www.freedomhouse.org), albeit in a somewhat different way than the Freedom House survey team does. Concretely, I picked all countries that received average scores for political rights and civic liberties between 4 and 6 during at least four consecutive years from 1980
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| | Authors: Schedler, Andreas. |
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The paper examines patterns of party-systemic competitiveness under
electoral authoritarianism – that is, under regimes that deploy regular
multiparty elections not as instruments democracy, but of authoritarian
rule. According to much of the literature, electoral authoritarian regimes
display dramatic difference in party-systemic competitiveness. While
“competitive” autocracies score high, “hegemonic” regimes score very
low on this dimension. The present paper shares this initial assumption,
yet proposes new venues for measuring and conceptualizing levels of
competitiveness among electoral autocracies.
Our sample is formed by 58 concurrent elections held in either electoral
autocracies or electoral democracies around the world between 1980 and
2002. In a first step, we compare mean levels of competitiveness across
levels of freedom as measured by average Freedom House scores. In a
second step, we introduce a new strategy of measuring and classifying
subtypes of electoral authoritarianism. Instead of relying on single
indicators and predefined thresholds, we classify our cases through the
“inductive” technique of cluster analysis on the basis of multiple
indicators of party-systemic competitiveness.
The External Boundaries of Electoral Authoritarianism
Most contemporary regimes in the so-called developing world organize
regular elections. In many of them, however, elections do not serve as
“instruments of democracy” (Powell 2000) but as instruments of
authoritarian rule. According to one gross estimate, about two fifths of all
developing countries qualify as electoral autocracies. Such regimes hold
regular multiparty elections but violate democratic principles in severe
and systematic ways (Schedler 2002b). On their democratic side, electoral
autocracies share borders with electoral democracies; on their
authoritarian side, they share borders with closed autocracies. Electoral
democracies conduct free and fair elections, but lack other elements of
liberal constitutional democracy (such as bureaucratic integrity and an
impartial judiciary). Closed autocracies either do not hold multiparty
elections for the chief executive, or if they do, conduct them in a climate
of repression that does not allow for more than the ritualistic participation
of nominal opposition parties.
The 58 concurrent elections which are to be examined in the present
paper are selected from a previously demarcated universe of electoral
autocracies and democracies. In order to identify electoral autocracies, I
relied, for a first cut and in the absence of better alternatives, on Freedom
House data (www.freedomhouse.org), albeit in a somewhat different way
than the Freedom House survey team does. Concretely, I picked all
countries that received average scores for political rights and civic
liberties between 4 and 6 during at least four consecutive years from 1980
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