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lobbyist learn to resolve conflict can potentially have one of two results. It either means
lobbyists are not acting as faithful representatives of their constituent interests when they
sacrifice group ideal positions to cut deals, or it means that bargaining among lobbyists to find
compromise positions can be the first step in creating greater consensus in the public behind
public policies. Which it is and how this takes place and the degree of public involvement is an
important question for future research.
In this paper I took a much smaller step and simply proposed a model of how lobbyists
take positions on issues in a competitive environment. In devising this model I attempted to
provide some common link between two otherwise separate literatures, namely group
organization and gaining influence, and use them to help determine how lobbyists take positions
on issues, which is, arguably, one of the most important strategic decisions a lobbyist makes on
an issue. It is the outcome of such a decision that dictates the amount of conflict or compromise
on an issue, how well a constituency is being represented, how closely lobbyists can work with
lawmakers, and very often whether new public policy will be enacted. Though I only used to
model to test coalition building among interest groups, the framework here can be used to test
other questions as well. As Axelrod (1967) explained in his early paper on conflict of interest in
politics, the level of conflict or competition is a critical independent variable in most political
research questions. Does competition enhance legislative gridlock? Can it enhance greater
public discourse on policy issues? Might it have implications for legislative elections? All of
these are research questions that, I hope, this model can explore in future work.
Convention