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The last decade has seen the study of group coalitions emerge as a vibrant new research
agenda in interest group politics. But what is most interesting theoretically, as Salisbury (1990)
pointed out, is not that interest groups are forming coalitions, for this has long been known (see
Truman 1951; Greenwald 1977; Schlozman and Tierney 1986), but that coalitions have become
essential for gaining political influence in Washington, D.C. Consequently, some of the very
best interest group research in the last decade has sought to understand why coalitions form,
what benefits and consequences membership brings, and whether they can create broad
consensus on divisive issues. For instance, Marie Hojnacki (1997; 1998) uncovered the
importance of reputation and willingness to contribute to the formation and maintenance of a
coalition as an incentive for groups to join. Similarly, Kevin Hula (1999) highlighted the
importance of other incentives to coalition formation, not only the sharing of financial resources,
but also the sharing of access to key lawmakers and even the rank and file lawmakers necessary
for building the majority in Congress and state legislatures for enacting new policy. This work
has contributed significantly to our understanding of modern politics, but I argue that the greatest
returns from studying the dynamics of coalition formation are yet to be had.
It is not too great a stretch to argue that coalition research would not have emerged with
out dramatic changes in the environment generated by interest group politics. It is not merely
that the number of organized interests lobbying Washington has grown dramatically since the
1950s, but that the range of ideologies espoused by new organizations are often at odds with
those that are older and more established. If the argument made by Wilson (1973), and more
poignantly by Browne (1990), that groups avoid competition by defining themselves into smaller
issue niches, is true, then there would be little need for coalitions. Coalitions are necessary
precisely because groups are choosing to lobby on the same issues. This is clearly exemplified
Convention