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Campaign Spending Effects in U.S. Senate Elections: Evidence from the National Annenberg Election Survey
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Introduction
The debate over the relative impact of campaign spending by congressional
challengers and incumbents began almost as soon as the first reliable campaign spending data appeared in the early 1970s
1
and continues to this day. Analysis of the data showed
that campaign spending was strongly related to congressional election results, but in a peculiar way. The relationship between spending and votes looked very different depending on the candidate’s incumbency status: the more candidates challenging incumbent officeholders spent, the better they did on election day; the more incumbents spent, the worse they did (Jacobson 1980). These simple relationships have reappeared in every election year since 1972 in the data for both House and Senate candidates.
No one has ever been so naïve as to take this pattern to mean that incumbents
actually lose votes and elections by spending too much money. The consensus explanation is that campaign spending by incumbents rises with the magnitude of the electoral threat they face; the more trouble they are in, the more they spend. The threat’s magnitude is reasonably approximated by the challenger’s level of spending (Jacobson 2004). When it is taken into account (typically by estimating a multivariate model which includes measures of spending by both candidates plus other variables thought to influence congressional election results), the incumbent’s spending no longer (in most models) appears to cost votes; but, almost as disconcertingly, it appears to have little or no effect. Spending by challengers, in contrast, is strongly related to the outcome; under every set of controls examined, the more challengers spend, the better they do in the election.
2
These results are not credible either, for there are compelling reasons to believe
that they overstate the effect of the challenger’s spending and understate the effect of the incumbent’s spending. The problem is that candidates and campaign contributors act strategically. Donors resist wasting money on hopeless causes; the better a challenger’s prospects, the more contributors are willing to invest in their campaigns, and the more challengers are able to spend. Spending by incumbents is also related to the expected outcome but in the opposite way: the higher the incumbent’s expected vote and the greater the likelihood of victory, the less money flows into the campaign. Not that secure incumbents have trouble raising money. Quite the contrary; many access-seeking contributors are happy to back sure winners. But raising funds is a chore, so the level of effort is adjusted to anticipated need. Again, electoral prospects affect campaign finances, but for incumbents, the relationship is negative: the larger their expected vote, the less they raise and spend.
1
Courtesy of the disclosure provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971.
2
See, for examples, the ordinary least square models in Glantz, Abramowitz, and Burkhart (1976),
Jacobson (1978, 1980, 1985); Green and Krasno (1988); Bartels (1990); Erikson and Palfrey (1998); Ansolabehere and Gerber (1994). The results hold for U.S. Senate races; see Jacobson (1978, 1980); Abramowitz and Segal (1992).
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Introduction
The debate over the relative impact of campaign spending by congressional
that campaign spending was strongly related to congressional election results, but in a
peculiar way. The relationship between spending and votes looked very different
depending on the candidate’s incumbency status: the more candidates challenging
incumbent officeholders spent, the better they did on election day; the more incumbents
spent, the worse they did (Jacobson 1980). These simple relationships have reappeared
in every election year since 1972 in the data for both House and Senate candidates.
No one has ever been so naïve as to take this pattern to mean that incumbents
actually lose votes and elections by spending too much money. The consensus
explanation is that campaign spending by incumbents rises with the magnitude of the
electoral threat they face; the more trouble they are in, the more they spend. The threat’s
magnitude is reasonably approximated by the challenger’s level of spending (Jacobson
2004). When it is taken into account (typically by estimating a multivariate model which
includes measures of spending by both candidates plus other variables thought to
influence congressional election results), the incumbent’s spending no longer (in most
models) appears to cost votes; but, almost as disconcertingly, it appears to have little or
no effect. Spending by challengers, in contrast, is strongly related to the outcome; under
every set of controls examined, the more challengers spend, the better they do in the
election.
These results are not credible either, for there are compelling reasons to believe
that they overstate the effect of the challenger’s spending and understate the effect of the
incumbent’s spending. The problem is that candidates and campaign contributors act
strategically. Donors resist wasting money on hopeless causes; the better a challenger’s
prospects, the more contributors are willing to invest in their campaigns, and the more
challengers are able to spend. Spending by incumbents is also related to the expected
outcome but in the opposite way: the higher the incumbent’s expected vote and the
greater the likelihood of victory, the less money flows into the campaign. Not that secure
incumbents have trouble raising money. Quite the contrary; many access-seeking
contributors are happy to back sure winners. But raising funds is a chore, so the level of
effort is adjusted to anticipated need. Again, electoral prospects affect campaign
finances, but for incumbents, the relationship is negative: the larger their expected vote,
the less they raise and spend.
1
Courtesy of the disclosure provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971.
2
See, for examples, the ordinary least square models in Glantz, Abramowitz, and Burkhart (1976),
Jacobson (1978, 1980, 1985); Green and Krasno (1988); Bartels (1990); Erikson and Palfrey (1998);
Ansolabehere and Gerber (1994). The results hold for U.S. Senate races; see Jacobson (1978, 1980);
Abramowitz and Segal (1992).
3
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