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Abstract
Expectations are an important part of our understanding of nomination
campaigns. Whether we look at expectations in terms of how they drive momentum for
candidates, or as a part of expected utility in the decisions of voters, the viability and
electability of candidates for their party’s nomination are key variables. Despite the
importance of expectations in nominations, little work has been done to explore how
expectations change over the course of a campaign. This paper establishes a theory of
electoral expectations by adapting the rational expectations literature to the problem of
electoral expectations. Under a model of rational expectations, I theorize that
expectations change as the result of a process in which voters incorporate additional
information about the candidates and their chances of winning election. Information
provided to voters comes from two sources: from the candidates directly, or through the
media. Using daily time-series from the 2000 National Annenberg Election Study, as
well as data on media coverage and individual campaign expenditures, I show that voters
use information rationally to form expectations of candidate chances in primary and
general elections.
Convention