 |
High-Quality vs. High-Brow: Can Soft News Ever be the Best News?
| |
| | Unformatted Document Text:
2
debate concerning news quality. For most commentators, all participation can be traced to utilitymaximization—as theorized by Downs (1957), who wrote that (1957: 219, 236)
To avoid surveying all the extant data, decision-makers seek informationsources which focus their attention upon certain relevant areas ofknowledge…. [T]he cost of information is bound to be different fordifferent men. Hence... [a]ny concept of democracy based on an electorateof equally well informed citizens is irrational; i.e., it presupposes thatcitizens behave irrationally.
Later, informed by the new cognitive science, researchers (e.g., Lupia and McCubbins 1998,Popkin 1994, et al.), specified that maximization takes place in environments where informationis not perfect and that, as a consequence, it is rational for voters to rely on information shortcuts.
These two assumptions—about what constitutes news quality and what explains political
participation—sit in an awkward tension. For if we take Downs’ calculus seriously, scholars’understanding of news quality—itself inherently normative and rooted in the news-junkie’sperspective that information-intensive news does, or at least should, maximize utility—largelyignores differences in the specific utility calculations of political participants themselves.According to Downs, individuals’ utility maximization leads to the greater democratic good, justas for Adam Smith, individual utility maximization in the market leads to economic growth. Butwhen it comes to news quality, the “best” news is traditionally what the doctor orders—definedfrom the scholars’ and the suppliers’ points of view. We find it problematic that widespreadnotions of “quality” are based largely on scholars’ assessments of news supply, rather thanattending to the content of citizens’ demand.
How can we make our concept of news quality consistent with our understanding of
individuals’ political behavior as utility maximizing in settings of incomplete information? Wepropose a descriptive definition to replace the prescriptive one: quality news, we argue, is thatwhich facilitates a citizen’s capacity to vote in her own best interests. Consistent with Downs andmost others who debate journalists’ proper role, we assume that voting according to one’s owninterests is a core “duty” of the democratic citizen. In this articulation, however, quality is not aresearcher’s assessment of news as more or less sensational, entertaining, analytical or factual.Rather, we argue that quality is embodied in different products for different people. Whereassome may need The New York Times to assess which candidate they “ought” to favor, others maydo just as well (or better) with Oprah. Quality, then, arises—or does not arise—in the interactionbetween the person and the product she chooses to consume. In short, quality is what works. Andwhat works for one person may differ from what works for another.
In order to assess the implications of our revised definition of news quality, we look to
the paradigmatic moment of civic participation: voting. In that context, any information thathelps a citizen improve her ability to select the candidate that most closely matches her own self-interests, is, for that citizen, high quality information. The greater, in turn, the extent to which agiven bit of information facilitates a “correct” vote, in the aforementioned sense, the higher is the“quality” of that information.
In order to assess our revised definition of news quality, we bring our alternative
definition to bear on a hard case: “soft news.” We develop and test a series of hypothesesconcerning the effects on different types of consumers (low vs. high political awareness) ofexposure to different types of news (“soft” vs. “hard”). In particular, we investigate the effects of
|
| |
| |
|
|
2
debate concerning news quality. For most commentators, all participation can be traced to utility
maximization—as theorized by Downs (1957), who wrote that (1957: 219, 236)
To avoid surveying all the extant data, decision-makers seek information
sources which focus their attention upon certain relevant areas of
knowledge…. [T]he cost of information is bound to be different for
different men. Hence... [a]ny concept of democracy based on an electorate
of equally well informed citizens is irrational; i.e., it presupposes that
citizens behave irrationally.
Later, informed by the new cognitive science, researchers (e.g., Lupia and McCubbins 1998,
Popkin 1994, et al.), specified that maximization takes place in environments where information
is not perfect and that, as a consequence, it is rational for voters to rely on information shortcuts.
These two assumptions—about what constitutes news quality and what explains political
participation—sit in an awkward tension. For if we take Downs’ calculus seriously, scholars’
understanding of news quality—itself inherently normative and rooted in the news-junkie’s
perspective that information-intensive news does, or at least should, maximize utility—largely
ignores differences in the specific utility calculations of political participants themselves.
According to Downs, individuals’ utility maximization leads to the greater democratic good, just
as for Adam Smith, individual utility maximization in the market leads to economic growth. But
when it comes to news quality, the “best” news is traditionally what the doctor orders—defined
from the scholars’ and the suppliers’ points of view. We find it problematic that widespread
notions of “quality” are based largely on scholars’ assessments of news supply, rather than
attending to the content of citizens’ demand.
How can we make our concept of news quality consistent with our understanding of
individuals’ political behavior as utility maximizing in settings of incomplete information? We
propose a descriptive definition to replace the prescriptive one: quality news, we argue, is that
which facilitates a citizen’s capacity to vote in her own best interests. Consistent with Downs and
most others who debate journalists’ proper role, we assume that voting according to one’s own
interests is a core “duty” of the democratic citizen. In this articulation, however, quality is not a
researcher’s assessment of news as more or less sensational, entertaining, analytical or factual.
Rather, we argue that quality is embodied in different products for different people. Whereas
some may need The New York Times to assess which candidate they “ought” to favor, others may
do just as well (or better) with Oprah. Quality, then, arises—or does not arise—in the interaction
between the person and the product she chooses to consume. In short, quality is what works. And
what works for one person may differ from what works for another.
In order to assess the implications of our revised definition of news quality, we look to
the paradigmatic moment of civic participation: voting. In that context, any information that
helps a citizen improve her ability to select the candidate that most closely matches her own self-
interests, is, for that citizen, high quality information. The greater, in turn, the extent to which a
given bit of information facilitates a “correct” vote, in the aforementioned sense, the higher is the
“quality” of that information.
In order to assess our revised definition of news quality, we bring our alternative
definition to bear on a hard case: “soft news.” We develop and test a series of hypotheses
concerning the effects on different types of consumers (low vs. high political awareness) of
exposure to different types of news (“soft” vs. “hard”). In particular, we investigate the effects of
|
|
 Convention | | All Academic Convention can solve the abstract management needs for any association's annual meeting. | | Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. | | Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! | | Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! | | Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. | | Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! | | Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! | | Click here for more information. |
|
|
|
| |
|
|
|
