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stability of this rally is not guaranteed, however, with the maintenance of support
dependent on a number of factors including the progress and duration of the war
effort.
4. Long build ups to the use of military force provide opportunities and pitfalls for
proponents of military intervention. In some cases, it can lead to a loss of support
(the War against Iraq) while in others it can be used to build support (to various
degrees, World War II, Vietnam and the Gulf War). In some cases, however
(Bosnia) public opinion appears remarkably resistant to change.
5. The ability of the public to resist appeals for the use of military force depends
heavily on the existence of counterarguments made by domestic political elites
and coverage of these counterarguments by the media (the Vietnam war between
late 1964 and 1968, the early phase of the build up towards the Gulf war, the build
up and “post capture of Baghdad” periods of the War against Iraq). When such
counter opinions are presented, the public tends to divide based on prior
predispositions associated with party, age, sex, education, race and the like.
6. The ability of the public to resist appeals for the use of military force also depends
on the makeup of the media environment. In periods when the public depends
heavily on a few media and/or sources (e.g., World War II or Vietnam) then
whoever best controls these media is most likely to control public opinion. In
more diverse media environments (e.g., that found during the Gulf War), control
of public opinion is more difficult, though not impossible.
7. The media is an important player in its own right in the shaping of public opinion
(periods during the Vietnam War, Bosnia), but it is susceptible to many of the
Convention