8
Following the Gulf of Tonkin resolution in August 1964, American commitment
of troops escalated, culminating with the dispatch of 100,000 combat troops to Vietnam
in July of 1965. By this time there was enough concern over U.S. policy and progress in
Vietnam that Gallup began to ask the question, “In view of developments since we
entered the fighting in Vietnam, do you think the U.S. made a mistake sending troops to
fight in Vietnam?” In August 1965, 61 percent of the American public disagreed with
this statement – a substantial though hardly overwhelming show of majority support for
U.S. military involvement. This would be the high point of support (as based on this
question), however. Belief that sending U.S. troops was not a mistake hovered just above
or below 50 percent from May 1966 to July 1967 (ranging from 48 percent to 52
percent), then began a steady decline to between 40 and 44 percent support between
October 1967 and April 1968. Between August 1968 and May 1970 belief that sending
troops was the right thing stayed between 32 and 39 percent, and in May of 1971 dropped
to 28 percent. Other indicators of public opposition to U.S. involvement in Vietnam
showed a similar pattern. For example support for the withdrawal of American troops
ranged from 6 percent to 19 percent from 1964 to 1967, from 21 to 36 percent in 1969,
from 35 to 40 percent in 1970, and from 55 to 73 percent in 1970 and 1971 (Lunch and
Sperlich, 1979).
As with the Korean War, the inability of the various administrations to maintain
public support for the War in Vietnam can be attributed to a number of factors, not the
least of which was the absence of a clear, tangible and direct threat to the United States or
its interests, coupled with the high cost in terms of American lives (over 58,000 deaths
and over 150,000 wounded or injured). But there are several important differences across
Convention