A Consensus Theory of Political Journalism
David Niven
Florida Atlantic University
and
John Glenn Institute of Public Service and Public Policy, Ohio State University
Prepared for the 2004 Annual Meeting of the American
Political Science Association, Chicago
The depiction of political issues in the media has long defied analytic understanding and
description. Important work, such as Bennett's Index Theory or Gans' Paraideology Theory – in
which mass media professionals largely set the voices in their coverage to mirror that of
mainstream government debate – offer compelling visions, but are only intermittently supported
by data. This paper suggests that such theories enjoy inconsistent support because they fail to
consider the interaction between journalists' incentives and the political climate. A theory is
advanced here that the journalists' objective to please their superiors, please themselves, limit
negative feedback, and expend minimum energy, in other words to minimize costs and maximize
benefits, relies on tactics that vary with the scope of consensus support for an issue. That is, for
example, the inclination to insert drama into coverage, present the appearance of objectivity, and
conform to popular opinion rises and falls based on the degree of political consensus present for
the issue. As an issue approaches near universal support, a reporter is likely to have little
inclination or ability to present drama or objectivity, but is also quite likely to conform to
established popular consensus. Conversely, as an issue approaches a complete lack of political
consensus, reporters are much freer to ignore popular opinion, but are more likely to present
coverage consistent with the desire to insert drama and their own personal opinion. This theory
is tested by analyzing U.S. media coverage on a sample of six political issues debated in
Congress and reveals that combining journalists' incentives with political consensus suggests a
better way to understand the political journalism process.