(Page 3 of 36) - Deliberation and Difference: The Contributions of Civic Dialogue authored by Walsh, Katherine.

(Mansbridge 1999). These programs are of particular interest for our understanding of the use of
deliberation to forge unity while respecting differences because they have been implemented by
public officials and activists who seek to improve relationships among people in their community
through acknowledging and thoroughly understanding difference. I examine the practice of
dialogue through closed-ended and open-ended questions embedded in surveys of people
conducting dialogue in two Midwestern cities, participant observation, and in-depth interviews
with practitioners, participants, and public officials in 45 cities throughout the United States. By
looking at the effects of the dialogue, listening to the way practitioners are using this
communication, and observing what takes place within it, this study expands our understanding
of the contributions of deliberation to heterogeneous democracy. We see that in practice, civic
dialogue is predominantly focused on recognizing and understanding cultural difference.
Although there is little attention to unity in the form of consensus or common ground, the way in
which people are using dialogue around the United States suggests a revision of our ideas about
the place of marginalized voices within the deliberative system.

HE DISTINCTIVENESS OF DIALOGUE

Why be concerned that deliberation tends toward domination? Some concerns stem from

claims that ideal deliberation is conducted with arguments that are widely accepted by members
of the population (e.g. Rawls 1996). Others stem from the perception that even if deliberation is
not expected to produce consensus but instead mutual respect (Gutmann and Thompson 1996),
deliberative settings privilege those who can speak in the language and symbols of dominant
groups (Sanders 1997; Young 1996, 2001). There is an expectation that members of dominant
groups will not listen—and certainly not hear-- marginalized voices, even if they are present in
the deliberation (Williams 2000). Many who wage these criticisms do not call for a stop to public
talk entirely. Instead, they suggest that deliberative democracy needs to include additional modes
of communication that are not as subject to these hegemonic effects. These arguments say that the
deliberative system requires communication such as storytelling (Young 1996), testimony
(Sanders 1997), discursive communication (Dryzek 2000), and uncivil, uncomfortable talk
(Schudson 1997). Each of these forms enables members of marginalized groups to voice their
unique perspectives in contexts in which members of dominant groups will listen.

Within the field of communication studies, these forms of communication are generally

referred to as “dialogue.” Whereas “deliberation” and “dialogue” are often used interchangeably,
and at times together,

by political theorists, communications scholars are quite explicit about the

distinction.

Specifically, dialogue is defined as a means of sharing perspectives, rather than

debating preferences (Anderson et al., 2004; Cissna and Anderson, 2002). It is typically
conceptualized as face-to-face interaction, in which the participants seek to understand others’
experiences. It is treated as an act in which meaning is constructed between people, not an act of
persuasion or exchanging information (Cissna and Anderson, 2002; Anderson et al., 2004; Pearce
and Littlejohn, 1997; Burkhalter et al., 2002, 408).

The ways in which this communication is therefore different from deliberation as

normally conceived by political theorists are numerous. Six main dimensions of deliberation
serve as points of comparison.

First, even though dialogue practitioners at times use the term

For example, “deliberative dialogue,” as in Deveaux, 2003, 781. Sometimes political theorists use the

term dialogue to refer to an abstract process of interaction of cultures (e.g. Mehta 2000). Theorists such as
Gadamer and Habermas, who are often named as the creators of modern theories of dialogue, are central to
much work on deliberation among political theorists (e.g. Benhabib 1990).

Compare to Dryzek (2000), who partially regrets the lack of a distinction between deliberation and

discursive democracy (vi).

Elsewhere (Walsh n.d.), I examine in detail how the practice of dialogue measures up to the criteria of

equality, publicity, reciprocity, consideredness, freedom from power, accountability, and focus on
consensus and common ground that Mansbridge (1999) identifies in Gutmann and Thompson (1996) and