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The September 11 attacks starkly highlighted the challenge of keeping commercial aviation
safe from terrorist and criminal attacks. In this paper I consider three major aviation security
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events in the United States: the Pan Am flight 103 (PAA 103) bombing over Lockerbie, Scotland
in 1988, the loss of TWA flight 800 (TWA 800) off Long Island, New York, in 1996 (which was
not, as it turned out, the result of terrorist action), and the clearly important September 11
hijackings and attacks. As I will show, prima facie evidence of instrumental learning (May, 1992)
is evident in all three of these cases, and learning that derives from direct experience is evident
after both PAA 103 and September 11. These events, and the debate in the weeks after the loss of
TWA 800, contributed to federal policy makers’ ability to quickly change law and regulations in
an attempt to address the policy failures that allowed four airliners to be hijacked nearly
simultaneously and deliberately crashed into targets on the ground.
Like all policy inspired by “focusing events” (Birkland 1997), the “window of opportunity”
(Kingdon 1995) for policy change in aviation disasters is rather short after a large, attention
grabbing event. This may be possible, as we will see, for two reasons. First, the initial enthusiasm
for the issue—among the media (which can serve as a proxy for public attention) and policy
makers—is likely to be quite short lived, even for as important an issue as the September 11
attacks. Second, as I will discuss, the “easy” solutions are often engaged and adopted first, in
order to do “something” after a focusing event. Ideas engaged later are often more controversial
and advocates for these policies face a policy environment in which urgency has waned, and, as
opponents to further change argue that new solutions have already been explored and need time
to work.
But going beyond the obvious notion of a focusing event as a “wake up call,” we can view
the PAA 103 and TWA 800 events as “rehearsals” for the comprehensive policy making that
followed the September 11 attacks. This is true for two reasons. First, the mode of attack—the
commandeering of airplanes for use as guided missiles—was novel to most policy makers.
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But
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Aviation security policy involves policies and practices designed protect commercial aircraft, airports, and
related facilities from criminal and terrorist attacks. I define “commercial aviation” as aviation operations
that are conducted under the provisions of Title 49 parts 121 and 135 of the Code of Federal Regulations.
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This is not to say that no one had contemplated the possibility of attacks of this sort. For example, a 1999
report prepared by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress noted:
Convention