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and more on creating strategic jumping-off points, its implementation will give U.S.
soldiers in foreign locations a smaller “footprint” than what they had during the cold war.
This means there will be less opportunity for exercises to go awry in heavily populated
areas, or for drunken misbehavior and crimes to disturb the locals for years on end.
Furthermore, since the new U.S. strategy is explicitly geared toward locating bases in
places where it serves U.S. global interests to do so, there may no longer be the
expectation that foreign populations should feel gratitude for the U.S. deterrent presence.
This may lead to more of an ongoing recognition among the U.S. forces of the need for
cultural sensitivity.
A final important point to take from this examination of South Korea is that post-
authoritarian societies will likely assume that prior U.S. support for authoritarian
governments signifies approval of their behavior, whether or not such approval actually
occurred in practice. It may appear that the U.S. did not adequately care about
democratization when its expression first began—even if the U.S. goes of far as to take
foreign democratic leaders into exile, as it did with Kim Dae-jung. It is the U.S.
association with violent tyranny that will be remembered. The U.S. government must
therefore consider very carefully the long-term security trade-offs for any short-term
alliances with dictators that are now pursued—and be careful about its decision to set up
bases in countries where brutal regimes send their own military forces to use violence
against democratic protestors.
Convention