8
Meanwhile North Korea continues to try to woo public opinion in the south to its side,
even as its Stalinist political economic system appears to be on the verge of collapse.
This means that there is always a suspicion among U.S. (and conservative South Korean)
officials that there is some element of foreign intrigue involved in the protest activity.
Particular suspicion attaches to the activities of the Hanchongnyon (Federation of Korean
University Student Councils) organization, an outlawed group which has often fomented
violence at demonstrations and is explicitly pro-North Korea. Other civic action groups
try to distance themselves from Hanchongnyon’s activities.
11
But South Korea’s elected
governments have been veering further to the left with time—at one point in 2003 they
considered legalizing Hanchongnyon, until twelve young members of the group disrupted
a live U.S. firing range exercise by barging in and hopping on an armored vehicle to
chant anti-American slogans and burn the U.S. flag
12
—and all of this leaves the U.S.
military feeling that it has few powerful friends in the country.
These underlying political tensions have been heightened by recent U.S. decisions about
the bases and the South Korean responses to those decisions. In summer 2004, 3,600
troops from the U.S. Army 2
nd
Infantry Division were permanently pulled out of the
country and redeployed for duty in Iraq. By December 2005, 12,500 of the 37,000 U.S.
troops that had been stationed in South Korea are scheduled to leave; most of those will
reportedly come from the bases north of Seoul that are now near the Demilitarized Zone
(DMZ) that separates north from south. By the end of 2008, the U.S. plans to close all of
11
Moon, “Korean Nationalism,” p. 150.
12
“Roh Vows Strong Action against Hanchongnyon,” Korea Times, Aug. 11, 2003; Joo Sang-min, “Parties
Heap Criticism on Hanchongnyeon,” Korea Herald, Aug. 12, 2003.
Convention