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Learning to Consolidate Democracy
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ABSTRACT
Can actors learn to consolidate democracy? In this paper, we begin to address this question by comparing how actors in different contexts bargained during crises so that we may see whether or not they learned to resolve crises and reinforce democracy. We investigate actors’ behavior in five types of countries: stable democracies (Italy and India), transitions to democracy (Mali and Portugal), unstable countries (Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador, and the Philippines), transitions to autocracy (Indonesia and Myanmar), and stable autocracies (Ivory Coast and Zaire). Within these twelve countries, we identify forty-two political crises that occurred between 1950 and 1999. We construct a bargaining model designed to capture actors’ behavior during crises that occurred in a single case – Italy. We then apply this model to thirty-nine crises in our remaining eleven countries. We find that these crises were more likely to be resolved when actors learned to increase their offers, even slightly. Furthermore, we find that learning helps to strengthen democracy. In the future, we will extend this work in two ways. First, we will study more directly the effect of actors’ behavior during crises on democratic consolidation. Second, we will examine whether actors learn not only within a single crisis but also across series of crises; that is, whether actors’ behavior in previous crises influences them to resolve subsequent ones.
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| | Authors: Casper, Gretchen. and Joyce, Kyle. |
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ii
ABSTRACT
Can actors learn to consolidate democracy? In this paper, we begin to address this question by
comparing how actors in different contexts bargained during crises so that we may see whether
or not they learned to resolve crises and reinforce democracy. We investigate actors’ behavior in
five types of countries: stable democracies (Italy and India), transitions to democracy (Mali and
Portugal), unstable countries (Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador, and the Philippines), transitions to
autocracy (Indonesia and Myanmar), and stable autocracies (Ivory Coast and Zaire). Within
these twelve countries, we identify forty-two political crises that occurred between 1950 and
1999. We construct a bargaining model designed to capture actors’ behavior during crises that
occurred in a single case – Italy. We then apply this model to thirty-nine crises in our remaining
eleven countries. We find that these crises were more likely to be resolved when actors learned
to increase their offers, even slightly. Furthermore, we find that learning helps to strengthen
democracy. In the future, we will extend this work in two ways. First, we will study more
directly the effect of actors’ behavior during crises on democratic consolidation. Second, we will
examine whether actors learn not only within a single crisis but also across series of crises; that
is, whether actors’ behavior in previous crises influences them to resolve subsequent ones.
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