29
(Table 4 about here.)
Before proceeding to the statistical analysis, we present two illustrative cases. The
first crisis, involving Indira Gandhi in India, is an example of actors learning to cooperate
in order to reinforce democracy. The second crisis, concerning Aung San Suu Kyi in
Myanmar, shows a case in which actors were unable to cooperate, and democracy was
not installed.
17
India: Indira Gandhi Crisis
India is a case of an unpredicted stable democracy; as such, it is a good case to
test the primary hypothesis derived from the Italy case (which in contrast was a predicted
stable democracy). The election of Indira Gandhi in 1975 is an example of a crisis where
the actors were bargaining within the political system to advance change.
In this crisis, there were two primary actors: the Indira Gandhi government and
opposition political parties. The first preference of Indira Gandhi was to remain in power.
On the other hand, opposition political parties wanted to force Indira Gandhi out of
office. Using the preferences of the opposition political parties, we can infer that an
opposition with a low reservation price would be willing to allow Indira Gandhi to
remain in power, while opposition political parties with a high reservation price would
prefer to suffer costs in order to demonstrate the intensity of their preference for forcing
Indira Gandhi out of power. Table 5 lists each actor’s preferences and constraints.
(Table 5 about here.)
17
In the interest of space, in this paper we present only these two illustrative crises. For information
regarding all forty-two crises across the twelve countries, see “Additional Tables for ‘Learning to
Consolidate Democracy’” on the first author’s webpage (
http://polisci.la.psu.edu
). This file presents crises
summaries, actors, preferences, and constraints for all of our cases.
Convention