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Learning to Consolidate Democracy
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Learning to Consolidate Democracy
Introduction
Can actors learn to consolidate democracy? In this paper, we begin to address this
question by comparing how actors in different contexts bargained during crises so that we
may see whether or not they learned to resolve crises and reinforce democracy.
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We
investigate actors’ behavior in five types of countries: stable democracies (Italy and
India), transitions to democracy (Mali and Portugal), unstable countries (Brazil, Bolivia,
Ecuador, and the Philippines), transitions to autocracy (Indonesia and Myanmar), and
stable autocracies (Ivory Coast and Zaire). Within these twelve countries, we identify
forty-two political crises that occurred between 1950 and 1999. We construct a
bargaining model designed to capture actors’ behavior during crises that occurred in a
single case – Italy. We then apply this model to thirty-nine crises in our remaining eleven
countries. We find that these crises were more likely to be resolved when actors learned
to increase their offers, even slightly. Furthermore, we find that learning helps to
strengthen democracy.
In the future, we will extend this work in two ways. First, we will study more
directly the effect of actors’ behavior during crises on democratic consolidation. Second,
we will examine whether actors learn not only within a crisis but also across series of
crises; that is, whether actors’ behavior in previous crises influences them to resolve
subsequent ones.
1
We thank the following people for their helpful comments and suggestions: Scott Bennett, Steven Brams,
Han Dorussen, Scott Gates, Miriam Golden, Birger Heldt, Tamar London, and Elizabeth Wood. Elena Kirtcheva and James Lombardi assisted us with the research, as did Sushmita Chatterjee, Tatiana Vashchilko, and Amber Boydstun. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Midwest Political Science Association, April 15-18, 2004, Chicago, Illinois; and the Workshop of Working Group 7 Civil Peace, Centre for the Study of Civil War, Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), May 14-15, 2004, Oslo, Norway. Work on this conference paper was supported, in part, by the Center for the Study of Civil War, PRIO. Listing of authors is alphabetical.
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| | Authors: Casper, Gretchen. and Joyce, Kyle. |
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Learning to Consolidate Democracy
Introduction
Can actors learn to consolidate democracy? In this paper, we begin to address this
question by comparing how actors in different contexts bargained during crises so that we
may see whether or not they learned to resolve crises and reinforce democracy.
1
We
investigate actors’ behavior in five types of countries: stable democracies (Italy and
India), transitions to democracy (Mali and Portugal), unstable countries (Brazil, Bolivia,
Ecuador, and the Philippines), transitions to autocracy (Indonesia and Myanmar), and
stable autocracies (Ivory Coast and Zaire). Within these twelve countries, we identify
forty-two political crises that occurred between 1950 and 1999. We construct a
bargaining model designed to capture actors’ behavior during crises that occurred in a
single case – Italy. We then apply this model to thirty-nine crises in our remaining eleven
countries. We find that these crises were more likely to be resolved when actors learned
to increase their offers, even slightly. Furthermore, we find that learning helps to
strengthen democracy.
In the future, we will extend this work in two ways. First, we will study more
directly the effect of actors’ behavior during crises on democratic consolidation. Second,
we will examine whether actors learn not only within a crisis but also across series of
crises; that is, whether actors’ behavior in previous crises influences them to resolve
subsequent ones.
1
We thank the following people for their helpful comments and suggestions: Scott Bennett, Steven Brams,
Han Dorussen, Scott Gates, Miriam Golden, Birger Heldt, Tamar London, and Elizabeth Wood. Elena
Kirtcheva and James Lombardi assisted us with the research, as did Sushmita Chatterjee, Tatiana
Vashchilko, and Amber Boydstun. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Midwest Political
Science Association, April 15-18, 2004, Chicago, Illinois; and the Workshop of Working Group 7 Civil
Peace, Centre for the Study of Civil War, Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), May 14-15, 2004, Oslo,
Norway. Work on this conference paper was supported, in part, by the Center for the Study of Civil War,
PRIO. Listing of authors is alphabetical.
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