(Page 19 of 21) - Illuminating the Gray Zone of Political Change: The Case of Peru's Fujimori Government 1990-2000 authored by McClintock, Cynthia.

Tuesta Soldevilla, Perú Político, pp. 444, 456, 505-506 and 531-532.

Oscar Medrano, "Réquiem por un Cómputo Parlamentario," Caretas No. 1359 (April 20, 1995), pp. 10-17

and Schmidt, "Delegative Democracy?" p. 116.

Catherine M. Congahan, "Troubled Accounting, Troubling Questions: Looking Back at Peru's Election,"

LASA Forum XXVI (Summer 1995), p. 9, citing polls in the last week of the campaign; and Latin
American Weekly Report, no. 11 (March 23, 1995), p. 124.

Calculation from data in World Bank, Social Indicators of Development 1993 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins

University Press, 1993).

For congressional results by department, see Tuesta, Perú Político, p. 339.

For further discussion, see Catherine M. Conaghan, The Permanent Coup: Deception and the Public

Sphere in Fujimori's Peru, manuscript submitted to Pittsburgh University Press, pp. 185-196 and Schmidt,
"Delegative Democracy?" pp. 115-11.

Resumen Semanal XVII, No. 818 (May 3-9), p. 1, and "Cierre con Bulla," Caretas (May 11, 1995), p. 19.

Resumen Semanal, XVII, No. 818 (May 3-9), p. 1.

Transparencia, "Informe del Conteo Rapido y la Observación Electoral de las Elecciones Generales de

1995," (Lima: Transparencia, 1995), pp. 75-78. Transparencia cautioned: "Our observation was limited to
the presidential vote and the congressional vote for the political organizations, and for technical reasons, did
not include the preferential vote." So, was it possible that, for every single one of the twenty political
parties, the difference between Transparencia's quick count and the official tally was less than one
percentage point? At this time, Transparencia was a fledgling organization.

Transparencia staffperson in communication with Julio Carrión, August 24, 2004; the substance of the

communication was e-mailed to the author. See also the points raised in the footnote directly above.

See for example "El Perú tiene una democracia consolidada y no necesita verificación electoral," Expreso,

April 11, 1995, A3.

"Secretario general de OEA presentó informe sobre comicios en el Perú," El Comercio, June 2, 1995, p.

A4.

Unit for the Promotion of Democracy, "Executive Summary: Electoral Observation Peru 1995"

(Washington, D.C.: Organization of American States, 1997), 28-29, and the U.S. Department of State's
1995 Country Report on Human Rights Practices for Peru.

Eduardo Stein, "La Memoria del observador," El Comercio, June 16, 2001, p. 1. Stein said to the author

that officials involved in the 1995 count had admitted to him that the congressional vote had been altered.
Author's interview, Washington, D.C. January 10, 2002.

Author's interview, Fernando Tuesta Soldevilla, July 26, 2002, in Lima.

Catherine M. Conaghan, "Making and Unmaking Authoritarian Peru: Re-election, Resistance, and Regime

Transition," The North-South Agenda Papers 47 (June 2001), 4.

See, for example, the publications of the Instituto de Defensa Legal, in particular its e-mail updates,

during the electoral period.

Conaghan, "Making and Unmaking," 7. The bribe was videotaped.

Conaghan, "Making and Unmaking," 4.

Coletta Youngers, "Deconstructing Democracy: Peru under President Alberto Fujimori," (Washington,

D.C.: Washington Office on Latin America, February 2000), 53.

Unfortunately, the polls were by different agencies; the 1990 poll was by Datum, while the 1998 poll was

by Apoyo. The trend was not disputed, however. For information on the precise question and samples, see
Cynthia McClintock, "Es autoritario el gobierno de Fujimori?" in Fernando Tuesta Soldevilla (ed.), El
Juego Político: Fujimori, la Oposición, y las Reglas (Lima: Fundación Friedrich Stiftung, 1999), p. 94.

See, for example, a survey by the Empresa Peruana de Investigación de Mercado cited in La República,

September 6, 1998, p. 3; and a survey by the University of Lima reported on Peru's weekly television news
program Panorama on June 15, 1997.

Again, unfortunately the surveys were by different companies (Datum in 1990 and Apoyo in 1998), but

the trend was not disputed. A 1996 Apoyo poll showed only 40 percent considering the elections fraudulent,
suggesting that the jump occurred after 1996. See McClintock, "Es Autoritario," for more information
about the items and surveys.

This problem is also described by Diamond, "Thinking about Hybrid Regimes," 22.

See, for example, the National Democratic Institute and Carter Center reports cited below, available at