2
How might we assess the intentions and capabilities of elites? Examining the
Fujimori government, this chapter proposes various indicators. They are: 1) a record of
assault against the constitutional order (such as a coup or coup attempt) 2) a record of
constitutionally dubious attempts to extend presidential term limits 3) a record of credible
charges of manipulation of the playing field and/or the vote count in previous elections
and 4) a substantial majority of citizens (and a larger percentage than during previous
democratic eras) judging the regime authoritarian in opinion polls. These indicators are
quite different from those proposed by Diamond; drawing on the African experience,
Diamond proposes an assessment based on seat and vote percentages and years of
incumbency.
6
A fifth indicator would be relevant for many cases: a state’s or ruling party’s use
of political violence to punish, terrorize, or demoralize the opposition.
7
In the case of the
Fujimori government, outright repression was limited. However, it did occur. The most
notorious cases were those of two army intelligence agents, Mariela Barreto and Leonor
La Rosa Bustamante; in retaliation against their apparent leaking of information about a
government death squad, in 1997 former colleagues killed Barreto and badly beat La
Rosa Bustamante. Commented an opposition legislator: “Fear became more palpable
after Barreto. People think, ‘if they [the National Intelligence Service] do this to one of
their own, what might they do to us?”
8
The first section of this chapter assesses the Fujimori government's record,
describing the four indicators of authoritarian intentions and capabilities stated above.
The second section examines Peru's 2000 election, showing that these intentions and
capabilities were not considered by key international actors as they sought to evaluate the
election. Without the capacity to consider the government's intentions and capabilities,
and also without clear thresholds for freedom and fairness, it was especially difficult for
election monitors to fail the elections on the basis of its tilted playing field--despite the
steepness of the tilt. Although ultimately international election observers judged Peru's
2000 elections "far from free and fair," this conclusion was a cliffhanger; also, despite
observers' criticism, the international community recognized Fujimori as Peru's new
president.
The chapter also highlights the special challenges raised by an electoral
authoritarian regime for the political opposition. Especially--as in the case of Fujimori's
Peru--when a regime is classified as partially democratic rather than electoral
authoritarian, analysts tend to perceive the shortcomings of the political opposition as the
key reason for its losses at the polls. This tendency, however, is to blame the victim. As
Schedler points out, electoral authoritarians "find ways to engineer the failure of
opposition parties."
9
During Peru's 2000 elections, the evidence of current manipulation
and abuse by the regime remained limited, and as a result--despite the government's past
record--it was very difficult for the political opposition to make its case that the election
did not meet democratic standards.
II. CLASSIFICATION OF THE FUJIMORI GOVERNMENT PRIOR TO THE 2000
ELECTIONS
Convention