3
identity” played such a key role in the events in Costa Rica in 2000 that they cannot be dismissed
as unimportant or “superficial,” nor automatically absorbed by some preconceived notion of
“rational” (understood as “utility-maximizing self-interest”) individual motivations. Plainly, the
issue is more complicated.
Costa Rica has enjoyed both political and economic stability for the better part of the last
fifty years. The political culture of the country has traditionally been one that rarely resorts to
non-institutional forms of political expression, emphasizes consensus over conflict, and puts
primary value on the values of peace and hard work. Additionally, the gradual structural
adjustment program designed to reduce state intervention in the economy and open markets up
for competition has enjoyed mostly positive results. Whereas political conflict, mass
mobilizations, and extremely contentious politics are the norm in most of Latin America, Costa
Rica does not have a strong tradition of anti-government collective action and is currently
experiencing relatively prosperous economic times. What is surprising about this case is that the
protests occurred at all. Their scope and magnitude were such that the government was forced to
rescind the initiative, effecting changes in national electoral politics, economic policy, and
relations with other countries that continue to be felt today. Though Costa Rica is exceptional for
a number of reasons in Latin American politics, and though the 2000 protests were unique, the
behavior of the Costa Rican people towards the initiative provides clues to aspects of the
relationship between governments and citizens that have been previously ignored by much of the
literature.
The first section of this paper presents the case in question in some detail. Section two
reviews some theories of government behavior and public reactions to it in contexts of economic
transition, and argues that they cannot explain the outbreak of the Combo protests. As an
Convention