(Page 19 of 32) - Testing Sincerity:Henry Kissinger's Opening Encounter With the Chinese Leadership authored by Duffy, Gavan. and Goh, Evelyn.

Kissinger tacitly agrees that there are concrete indications of Soviet aggressive intent in
the buildup of their forces in the West and East (56h). However, he points out that it is
too dangerous for the Soviets to attack Western Europe (57), because of the prospect of a
nuclear confrontation. However, Kissinger goes on, the Soviets were seeking to create an
atmosphere of peace in the West in order to free themselves to move East or South (58).
Thus by implicature (58g), Kissinger denies (55g) – the US was not gullible enough in
détente to fail to see the full range of Soviet intentions.

Having established this, Kissinger brings the discussion back to the more extreme
possibility of a Sino-Soviet war. Therefore, with this clear sight on the part of the US, he
states that should such a war occur as a result of US-SU détente, it would be the result of
“misjudgment, not deliberate policy” (59). We read this in two ways. First, it is an
indirect speech act promising that the US will not deliberately cause a Sino-Soviet war
(59b). Reflexive intention (59c) reinforces (35c) made to Mao: Kissinger promises that if
the US should ever aid or abet a SU attack on the PRC, it would be unknowing, non-
deliberate, and the result of misjudgment. Second, this statement is also an assertion,
with underlying warnings. It serves to remind the Chinese that the Soviet Union is a
threat to China (60h), and that a Sino-Soviet war is a distinct possibility (60e). At the
same time, implicature (60f) serves as a warning that the US might commit a
misjudgment and inadvertently help to cause a Soviet attack on China. Thus implicature
(60g), that both the Chinese and the Americans should judge Soviet intentions carefully.
So, (60g) helps to strengthen Kissinger’s denial of Zhou’s implicature (55g), that the
Americans are gullible. Kissinger further warns that a Sino-Soviet war could result if the
West becomes “morally disarmed” (61f) – a development which would threaten both the
US and China (62e).

Kissinger and Zhou also discuss Soviet-American negotiations for an Agreement on the
Prevention of Nuclear War, which, amongst other things, would obligate the US and
Soviet Union to consult and coordinate their actions in the event that any other states,
including their allies, attack each other. The Chinese view was that this would constitute
a superpower condominium, which would allow the Soviets to keep competing with the
US for influence in various parts of the world, e.g. Middle East, where they could not
only foster aggression through proxies, but then have a lasting role in conflict resolution.
In this vein, Zhou asserts that rather than aiming to prevent nuclear war (63), the Soviets
really wanted the PNW as a secret deal to manage competition with the US (64e, 64f) and
thereby freeing them to threaten other states like China (64g, 64h). Kissinger hastens to
assure Zhou that the US has not conducted any agreement that harms China’s interests
(65e, 66e). Indeed, he promises that the US would not make any secret deals with the
Soviet Union (67b), and that the Chinese will be kept informed of Soviet-American
agreements, which will be published (68b).

Comments

By February 1973, then, not long into the opening, the Chinese were already questioning
US intentions in relation to détente and the sincerity of US propositions of common