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Testing Sincerity:Henry Kissinger's Opening Encounter With the Chinese Leadership
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particular actions – which more reliably signal sincere intent. Because they are particularly apt tools for describing and analyzing the costs and benefits associated with actors’ interactions, much analysis of strategic interaction relies upon game models. Despite their preference for costly signaling, game theorists have long acknowledged the importance of communication in strategic interaction. For Thomas Schelling, pre-play discussions between adversaries usefully focused the interaction to a manageable number of plausible alternative joint outcomes, thereby reducing indeterminacies.
1
In her APSA
Presidential Address, Elinor Ostrom recounts the volume of evidence supporting the contention that communication facilitates cooperation.
2
A cottage industry in the
analysis of “cheap talk games” has arisen recently in economics.
3
Not all strategic talk can be insincere, of course, since actors who consistently communicate insincerely soon find themselves devoid of conversation partners. If all talk were insincere in strategic contexts, there would be no Senate debate, no labor-management negotiations, and no academic department meetings (huzzah!). Indeed, there would be no diplomacy, as the enterprise would be pointless. This consideration underscores an important recognition – that talk after all is not completely costless after all. Insincere communications can impose the cost of undermining one’s reputation. In diplomacy (if not in poker), this cost can debilitate. Although reneging on one’s commitments can produce gains in strategic settings, some talk – perhaps even most of it – is necessarily sincere. Because participants know this, in settings in which reputation is important they do not dismiss the verbal productions of other participants out-of-hand.
[T]alk is cheap (it does not directly affect payoffs), but, given that people respond to it, talk definitely affects payoffs. A misinformed listener will do something that is not optimal for himself and, if their interests are sufficiently aligned, this is bad for the speaker too. In a nutshell, this is how cheap talk can be informative in games, even if players ruthlessly lie when it suits them.
4
These considerations support the presumption of dialogical/pragmatic analysts that we can gain insights into strategic interaction by directly analyzing negotiation talk using methods drawn from linguistics and logic.
5
However, the problem of cheap talk has only
dissipated, not disappeared. The strategic nature of negotiations implies the possibility
1
Thomas C. Shelling, Strategy of Conflict. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1960, pp. 84-118.
2
Elinor Ostrom, “A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action:
Presidential Address, The American Political Science Association, 1997.” American Political Science Review. 92: 1998, 1-22. See especially pp. 7-8.
3
For an overview, see Joseph Farrell and Matthew Rabin, “Cheap Talk.” Journal of Economic
Perspectives. 10 (3) 1996: 103-118.
4
Ibid., p. 104.
5
Gavan Duffy; Brian K. Frederking and Seth A. Tucker, ‘Language Games: Dialogical Analysis
of INF Negotiations’, International Studies Quarterly 42 (1998), pp. 271-294.
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| | Authors: Duffy, Gavan. and Goh, Evelyn. |
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particular actions – which more reliably signal sincere intent. Because they are
particularly apt tools for describing and analyzing the costs and benefits associated with
actors’ interactions, much analysis of strategic interaction relies upon game models.
Despite their preference for costly signaling, game theorists have long acknowledged the
importance of communication in strategic interaction. For Thomas Schelling, pre-play
discussions between adversaries usefully focused the interaction to a manageable number
of plausible alternative joint outcomes, thereby reducing indeterminacies.
1
In her APSA
Presidential Address, Elinor Ostrom recounts the volume of evidence supporting the
contention that communication facilitates cooperation.
2
A cottage industry in the
analysis of “cheap talk games” has arisen recently in economics.
3
Not all strategic talk can be insincere, of course, since actors who consistently
communicate insincerely soon find themselves devoid of conversation partners. If all
talk were insincere in strategic contexts, there would be no Senate debate, no labor-
management negotiations, and no academic department meetings (huzzah!). Indeed,
there would be no diplomacy, as the enterprise would be pointless. This consideration
underscores an important recognition – that talk after all is not completely costless after
all. Insincere communications can impose the cost of undermining one’s reputation. In
diplomacy (if not in poker), this cost can debilitate.
Although reneging on one’s commitments can produce gains in strategic settings, some
talk – perhaps even most of it – is necessarily sincere. Because participants know this, in
settings in which reputation is important they do not dismiss the verbal productions of
other participants out-of-hand.
[T]alk is cheap (it does not directly affect payoffs), but, given that people
respond to it, talk definitely affects payoffs. A misinformed listener will
do something that is not optimal for himself and, if their interests are
sufficiently aligned, this is bad for the speaker too. In a nutshell, this is
how cheap talk can be informative in games, even if players ruthlessly lie
when it suits them.
4
These considerations support the presumption of dialogical/pragmatic analysts that we
can gain insights into strategic interaction by directly analyzing negotiation talk using
methods drawn from linguistics and logic.
5
However, the problem of cheap talk has only
dissipated, not disappeared. The strategic nature of negotiations implies the possibility
1
Thomas C. Shelling, Strategy of Conflict. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1960, pp. 84-118.
2
Elinor Ostrom, “A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action:
Presidential Address, The American Political Science Association, 1997.” American Political
Science Review. 92: 1998, 1-22. See especially pp. 7-8.
3
For an overview, see Joseph Farrell and Matthew Rabin, “Cheap Talk.” Journal of Economic
Perspectives. 10 (3) 1996: 103-118.
4
Ibid., p. 104.
5
Gavan Duffy; Brian K. Frederking and Seth A. Tucker, ‘Language Games: Dialogical Analysis
of INF Negotiations’, International Studies Quarterly 42 (1998), pp. 271-294.
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