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section, Miles and Huberman evince considerable awareness of the complexities of the
criteria debates. In order to sidestep “all of the thorny [epistemological] problems,” they
offer questions as “practical guidelines” under each criteria set (1994, 277). Yet a
question under one criterion set could well go, logically, in another. For example, under
the heading “Objectivity/Confirmability,” they ask, “Can we follow the actual sequence
of how data were collected, processed, condensed/transformed and displayed for specific
conclusion drawing?” (278). But this question could just as well be asked under the
criterion of “Reliability/Dependability/Auditability” in that an audit assesses the “actual
sequence” of data generation.
If there is no stable and coherent distinction between the criteria and techniques,
why has this distinction persisted? Part of the answer is that conversations about quality
do occur at these two levels and, more important, at the level of practical judgment, it is
often to technique that scholars turn. Hence, it is not particularly useful for a researcher to
be told that her study is not “valid” in some global sense. A responsible reviewer
indicates particular techniques to enhance validity; e.g., “This study is lacking the sort of
‘thick description’ appropriate to the methodology of participant-observation.” Or, e.g.,
“This study is not credible without information indicating the time in the field
(‘prolonged engagement’) or the researcher’s understanding of his or her field role
(‘reflexivity’).” My point, then, is not that the distinction is totally without merit but that
few analyzing this literature have noted the instability and incoherence of the usage nor
commented on its significance.
12
Rather, the view of M&H may be more typical. They
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Atkinson et al. (2003) have noted the proliferation of terms but not this particular
incoherence.
Convention