Ostrom 1989; Oppenheimer, Stimson, and Waterman 1986; Tufte 1975) and interbranch
bargaining (Edwards 1985; Fleisher and Bond 1983; Rivers and Rose 1985). On the
individual level, the natural leap from presidential approval to presidential vote choice
has been well established (Finkel 1993; Markus 1988).
As a dependent variable, scholars have demonstrated that the state of the economy
is a very strong predictor of presidential approval (Hibbs 1982; Kernell 1978; MacKuen,
Erikson, and Stimson 1992; Mutz 1993; Norpoth 1996; Ostrom and Simon 1988; Tufte
1975). Beyond the strong consensus that the economy has an effect on presidential
approval, however, there is wide disagreement on how it has an effect. First, there is the
debate between ‘pocketbook’ (voting based on personal economic experiences) and
‘sociotropic’ (voting based on how one’s perceived group is faring) voting perspectives
(Kinder, Adams, and Gronke 1989; Kinder and Kiewiet 1981; Miller and Shanks 1996).
This debate has largely shifted to focus over which individuals respond differently to
individual or social circumstances (Mutz 1993; Sears and Lau 1983; Sears et al. 1980).
Another point of contention arises between those who argue that the public is
‘retrospective’—using evaluations of the past to guide voting—(Fiorina 1981; Norpoth
1996) or prospective—basing votes on expectations of the future (Erikson, MacKuen,
and Stimson 2002; MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1992). Clearly, many scholars have
spilled a great deal of ink making the basic point: the economy matters a lot in how
people evaluate the job the president is doing.
What else affects presidential approval? Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson (2002)
do an admirable job of summarizing the basic threads. Besides the economy, foreign
policy successes and setbacks have effects, as do foreign wars (Mueller 1973).
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Convention